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My objective in writing this thesis was to trace the history of the group identities of Sunni and 
Shi‘i Arabs in Iraq from the late Ottoman period and the creation of the modern-state of Iraq through 
the British Mandate to the emergence of the Islamic State in 2014. My specific interest within this 
period of about 150 years is, first, in how the different governments over time shaped these communal 
identities and second, the impact that state-led violence and, especially, after the U.S. invasion of 2003, 
by non-state actors, had on their communal identities. In particular, this thesis traces the politicization 
of these identities by successive governments; the large-scale violence the government of Saddam 
Hussein unleashed against civilians on the basis of their ethno-religious identities; the discrimination 
and violence against Sunnis, especially, by the U.S. occupation; the calculated use of sectarian violence 
against civilians by different sectarian militias and, finally, the evolution towards communal violence 
in which ordinary Sunni and Shi‘i Iraqis become the perpetrators of violence against each other. Key to 
the approach followed in this thesis was to avoid, on the one hand, essentializing these identities as 
monolithic and static, and, on the other hand, ignoring their historical significance. 
In conducting my research, some of the concepts that helped frame this thesis are: 
(1) That of communal/group identity, an identity based on shared aspects such as 
geographic location, culture, religion, ethnicity, language, and historical experiences and memory. The 
two communal identities under study here are those of the Sunni Arabs and the Shi‘i Arabs of Iraq. 
Mahmood Mamdani gives a succinct definition of the politicization of group identities due to 
differential treatment by the state, in his case, “ethnic” identities, and in the case of this thesis, 
“religious” identities, as follows: 
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It is not that ethnicity did not exist in African societies prior to colonialism; it did. I want to 
distinguish between ethnicity as a cultural identity—an identity based on a shared culture—
from ethnicity as a political identity. When the political authority and the law enforces identity 
subjects ethnically and discriminate between them, then ethnicity turns into a legal and 
political identity. Ethnicity as a cultural identity is consensual, but when ethnicity becomes a 
political identity it is enforced by the legal and administrative organs of the state.2 
 
(2) That of communal violence, violence against members of an identity group, perpetrated 
by members of another identity group, on the basis of their group identity. Communal violence is 
different than large-scale identity-based violence by the state, for example, because it is about civilians 
against civilians. 
The history of the Sunni and Shi‘i Arabs of Iraq can only be understood against the 
background of the political history of Iraq from the mid-nineteenth century until today. This thesis is 
structured chronologically, beginning with the late Ottoman period and the creation of the modern 
state of Iraq, through the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, the collapse of the regime in 2003, and the 
U.S.-led occupation and nation-building project that ended with the emergence of a new autocrat—
Nuri al-Maliki—and, to an important extent in response to his discriminatory and violent acts, that of 
the Islamic State. Each chapter discusses four periods of the political history of Sunni and Shi‘i Arabs 
in Iraq. A summary of each chapter is as follows: 
(1) Chapter One, 1861–1979, traces the history of the region that would become Iraq from 
the late Ottoman period to the establishment of the state of Iraq under British authority, through 
quasi-independence in 1932, the end of the Hashemite Monarchy in 1958, the rise of the Ba’th Party 
                                               
2. Mahmood Mamdani, “Making Sense of Political Violence in Postcolonial Africa,” Identity, Culture and 
Politics 3, no. 2 (December 2002): 10. 
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political figures in 1968, and ends with Saddam Hussein’s ascendency to the presidency in 1979. The 
purpose of this chapter is to establish a historical foundation for the history of group relations and 
communal identities prior to the creation of the modern state and to analyze the degree of 
politicization of these identities over the first period of modern Iraqi history. During the Ottoman 
Empire, the Ottoman elite and high bureaucratic officials in the region that would become Iraq were 
almost exclusively Sunni Arabs. Not all Sunni Arabs were elite, however, but this subgroup by and 
large dominated the upper echelons of Iraqi government and society in this period. There is little 
evidence that within the Mesopotamia Province, as modern-day Iraq was known then, there was any 
active use of violent force against Shi‘i Arabs, though there certainly was exclusion from top positions 
and rank. It appears that Sunni and Shi‘i leaders—the latter primarily the mujtahidun, or top Shi‘i 
clerics—tried their best to interact with each other only for pragmatic and necessary matters. For the 
most part, Shi‘i Arabs were left to their own devices, which they preferred to involvement with the 
state, and local and imperial Ottoman officials only became involved when the actions of particular 
groups or individuals appeared to be a threat to the Empire. 
Once the state had been created by the British, the latter not only appointed an outsider as 
king of Iraq—Faisal I, a Sunni Arab from the Hijaz—but also largely depended on existing hierarchies 
to create a new bureaucracy. Sunni Arabs mostly filled the top ranks of the new Iraqi government. 
Faisal, however, did make efforts to reach out to the Shi‘i Arab leadership of Iraq, but these efforts 
appear to have stopped with his death in 1933. The period between his death and the rise of the Ba’th 
Party’s prominence within Iraqi politics is marked by a series of coup d’états and grabs for power, 
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mostly from within the ranks of the military. The Ba’th Party came to power in 1968 and this chapter 
ends with Saddam’s Hussein’s ascendency to the presidency in 1979. 
(2) Chapter Two, 1979–2003, traces the history of Iraq under Saddam Hussein. While 
Saddam was Sunni Arab, he was from the lower classes, born to a poor family in the small town of 
Tikrit, west of Baghdad. Saddam, therefore, reached the top ranks in spite of his low socioeconomic 
status and in defiance of elite dominance until then. Because of that, he created his own system of 
power that relied heavily on the B’ath Party, the military, and his extended kinship group from Tikrit, 
and within these institutions, loyalty to him personally. The Iran-Iraq War, which began in 1980, was 
the catalyzing moment that led to the emergence of state-led violence against civilians on the basis of 
their ethno-religious identities, namely against the Shi‘i Arabs in the south and the Kurds in the north 
of the country. With the war against Iran, Saddam’s rhetoric shifted to include a new construction of 
“us against them:” the true Muslims, the (Sunni) Arabs, against the Shi‘i “Persians” of Iran and by 
implication, of Iraq. Then, with the invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent anti-Saddam uprisings by 
the Shi‘i Arabs in the south of the country, there was another instance of state-led violence in the 
course of the repression of the uprisings. These new levels of exclusion and violence shaped and 
hardened Shi‘i (and Kurdish) group identities in new ways, as will be discussed further in the 
conclusion. 
(3) Chapter Three, 2003–2008, traces the history of the Iraq War, starting with the U.S.-led 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the occupation and nation-building effort that followed. The purpose in 
explaining these efforts and their effects is to show how the Iraq War eliminated the existing elite, 
which was Sunni, a subgroup that at this point had been in power for many decades, and replaced 
Bader 11 
them with a Shi‘i Arab political elite. The de-Ba’thification order and the dissolution of the Iraqi 
armed forces had catastrophic consequences, including political and social chaos, the emergence of 
sectarian militias and shadow governments—such as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution 
in Iraq (SCIRI) and its armed wing, the Badr Brigade, in Basrah, and Muqtada al-Sadr’s Sadrist 
movement and Mahdi Army in Baghdad and the southern marsh regions—and a steep rise in everyday 
violence. This chapter ends with the de-escalation of what much of the scholarly literature refers to as 
the “civil war,” which was a two-year explosion of violence between sectarian political factions, mainly 
in Baghdad. 
(4) Chapter Four, 2008–2014, traces the history of Iraq after the civil war and after the U.S. 
withdrawal. While the roots of the Islamic State (IS) are not based in Iraq alone, this stage of 
communal violence perpetrated by the IS was in large part a reaction to the violent state-led repression 
of Sunni political elements in Iraq and of ordinary civilians. The violence led by Shi‘i sectarian groups 
was also in response to the large-scale violence committed against Shi‘i civilians that began in earnest in 
the 1980s. The fourth and final chapter, therefore, examines the emergence of IS and in the 
conclusion, I will reflect on the consequences of each stage of political history and the level of violence 









The Invention of an Iraqi State: 





Before the creation of the modern Iraqi state under British mandate in 1921, the region was 
known as the Ottoman province of Mesopotamia. The province was made of three distinct wilayat, or 
states: Basrah in the south, on the Persian Gulf coast; Mosul in the north, equidistant from the borders 
of modern-day Syria, Turkey, and Iran; and Baghdad on the Tigris River, in the middle Euphrates 
region.3 The architects of the British Mandate brought these three regions—distinct in their social, 
economic, and religious makeup, though not isolated—under the singular “Iraq.” More than half of 
the population of Iraq identified as Shi‘i Muslim Arabs; about twenty percent as Sunni Kurds 
(ethnically different from Arabs); eight percent as Jewish, Christian, Yazidi, Sabaean, or Turkoman; 
and less than twenty percent as Sunni Arab, though some historians regard the proportion of Shi‘i to 
Sunni Muslims more about sixty to forty.4 The split of Islam into the denominations of Sunnism and 
Shi‘ism dates back to the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 and the initial emergence of the 
Shi‘i ‘Ali.5 This thesis will focus on the history of the particular uses of Sunni and Shi‘ite identities 
from the end of Ottoman rule in Iraq in 1918 through Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship from 1979 to 
the invasion of the United States-led coalition in Iraq in 2003. Specifically, this thesis will focus on the 
social, political, and economic developments of Sunni and Shi‘i Arabs and moments of communal 
                                               
3. Wilayah is the singular, meaning “state;” wilayat is the plural, meaning “states.” 
4. Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 31. 
5. John L. Esposito, The Oxford Dictionary of Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
https://doi.org/10.1093/acref/9780195125580.001.0001. While this thesis will not focus on the religious roots of 
Sunnism and Shi‘ism, it is worth giving a brief background on these two denominations. Sunni Islam describes the largest 
branch of Islam and derives its main source of knowledge from the Sunna, or the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, 
and places particular stress on the importance of the ijma’, or community consensus as determined by religious scholars. 
Shi‘i Islam describes the second largest branch of Islam and not only places emphasis on the religious guidance of the 
Prophet’s descendants, but restricts it to the Ahl al-Bayt, the Prophetic family. 
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violence during the Iraq War, in which group leaders co-opted these developments for particular aims. 
This chapter will discuss the development of new state institutions and the sociopolitical history from 
the end of the Ottoman period through the establishment of the British Mandate in Iraq and up to 
Saddam Hussein’s seizure of power in 1979. 
 
IRAQ UNDER OTTOMAN RULE: THE MESOPOTAMIA PROVINCE 
The role of tribal groups 
During the time of the Ottoman Empire, modern-day Iraq was known as Mesopotamia and 
had been under the control of the Ottomans since late 1533.6 Mesopotamia consisted of three wilayat: 
Mosul, Baghdad, and Basrah, all of which were governed by individual governors who were under the 
auspices of the sultan in Istanbul. Though there was a formal government in the three wilayat, 
unofficially the region was governed by the various tribal groups. These tribal groups, in hierarchical 
order by size, were categorized into the following: qabila (confederation), ashira (tribe), fakhd 
(section), and bayt (house). The sheikhs—here meaning chiefs—or aghas in Turkish, of the ashiras 
were the most prominent figures within the tribal confederations, though often their duties were 
delegated to the sirkals, or deputies to the sheikh. The paramount sheikh of each tribe typically served 
as the mediator between the tribe and the government during the Ottoman period. The various groups 
in Mesopotamia were divided by socioeconomic status and were delineated by “people of the camel,” 
                                               
6. Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi‘is of Iraq (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 14. 
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“people of the sheep,” “cultivators,” and “buffalo-breeding marsh dwellers;” the most powerful of the 
confederations were the people of the camel.7 
 
Map 1: 
The ethnoreligious demography of the Mesopotamia Province in the early-twentieth century.8 
The wilayat 
Mosul, in the northeast of Mesopotamia, along the Tigris River, was largely populated by 
Sunni Arabs and Sunni Kurds. In the far northern and eastern parts of the wilayah were mostly 
                                               
7. Gökhan Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890–1908 (London: Routledge, 2006), 72. 
8. William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, The History of the Modern Middle East (Boulder: Westview Press, 
2013), 145. 
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Kurdish Sunni tribal groups that belonged to either the Qadiri or the Naqshbandi confederations. 
Prior to the 1830s, the Kurds in the north lived in a semi-autonomous emirate, or territory. In the 
1830s, however, the emirate was destroyed by Sultan Mahmud II and consequently the tribal 
confederations’ influence and power expanded. In the Kirkuk-Sulaymaniyah region in southeastern 
Mosul lived the Barzinji sayyids, or lords, of the Qadiri order. Prior to the Russo-Ottoman War of 
1877–8, these sayyids controlled all of the Kurdish tribes of Sulaymaniyah with the exception of the 
Jaf tribe.  Rivaling the Barzanjis in the region were the Talibanis, also of the Qadiri confederation.9 
Following the Russo-Ottoman War, the Hamawand tribe rose to power and prominence. In the late 
1800s the Hamawand and the Jaf tribe were intense regional rivals, which caused many problems for 
the Ottomans, who were unable to control these tribal groups.10 
 Baghdad, which is in the mid-Euphrates region of Mesopotamia, had the most equal 
distribution of Sunni and Shi‘i Muslims of the three wilayat.11 Baghdad was the least affected by tribal 
insurrections and caused the least amount of problems for the Ottoman government, due in large part 
to the reforms of the Tanzimat Period under Baghdad governors Mehmed Namik Paşa (1861–67) and 
Midhat Paşa (1869–72).12 During this period, the governors redistributed state lands in areas 
                                               
9. Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 74. 
10. Ibid., 75. 
11. Ibid., 193. According to an 1894 census conducted by Vital Cuinet, a French geographer and orientalist, there 
were about 309,000 Sunni Muslims and 480,000 Shi‘i Muslims in Baghdad. 
12. Michiel Leezenberg and Mariwan Kanie, “Governing Islam by Tribes and Constitutions: British Mandate 
Rule in Iraq,” in Colonial and Post-Colonial Governance of Islam: Continuities and Ruptures, eds. Marcel Maussen, Viet 
Bader, and Annelies Moors, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011), 92–3. The Tanzimat Reforms were 
sweeping reforms instituted by the Sultans Abülmejid I (r. 1839–1861) and Abdülaziz (r. 1861–1876). Influenced by 
Western ideals of modernity, including sovereignty and constitutional monarchial power, the Reforms aimed to create a 
more centralized state in pan-Islamic terms. The Reforms themselves had little impact on the faraway Province of 
Mesopotamia, however, the ideology of the Reforms inspired other reforms and policies in the Province, notably the Land 
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controlled by various tribal confederations, granting land titles to paramount sheikhs, city merchants, 
and other notables. In addition to increasing private ownership of land, these efforts largely had the 
effect of eroding the pre-existing tribal system, especially in places such as Diyalah, Karbala, and 
Baghdad. In Hilla-Diwaniyah, among other regions within the wilayah, the reforms had a less 
significant effect on the tribal system; the most important changes in these regions were the lessening 
power of the paramount sheikhs and the increasing power of the lesser sheikhs and the sirkals. Only in 
the Western desert region, where many tribal groups still remained nomadic tribes, did these reforms 
incite insurrections against the Ottoman government, especially among the tribal groups of the Aniza 
and the Shammar Jarba.13 
Basrah, the southernmost wilayah of Mesopotamia, was predominantly Shi‘i Muslim and 
Arabic-speaking. Basrah is located on the Persian Gulf, and following developments in international 
shipping technology, merchants in Basrah were able to enter into regional trade markets and the 
commercial sector became the main source of employment in the wilayah. The wilayah was a port of 
trade for the Mesopotamia regional market and for markets beyond the Ottoman borders. As will 
become important later, for much of Basrah’s landed and merchant class it was imperative to have the 
support—or to at least seek the support—of whomever would reinforce and cultivate the trade 
                                               
Code of 1869 (which will be discussed in more detail later). The era of the Reforms, from 1839 to 1876, is commonly 
called the “Tanzimat Period.” 
13. Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 86. 
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economy.14 Basrah, like Baghdad, was also greatly affected by the Tanzimat Period, though the tribal 
system still remained intact and significant throughout the late Ottoman period.15 
 
Map 2: 
The Mesopotamia Province at the end of the nineteenth century.16 
Basrah was divided into two main regions, Muntafiq and ‘Amarrah, and unlike Baghdad, 
Basrah’s various tribal groups posed many problems for the Ottoman government. The Muntafiq 
tribal group, the largest in Basrah, controlled the Muntafiq region in the western part of the wilayah. 
Of the various sections of the tribal group, the Sadun was the ruling family. Though most of the 
                                               
14. Reidar Visser, Basra, The Failed Gulf State: Separatism and Nationalism in Southern Iraq (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 2005), 13–14. 
15. Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 87. 
16. Ali A. Allawi, Faisal I of Iraq (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 338. 
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tribesmen of the Muntafiq were Shi‘i Muslims, the Sadun family was Sunni.17 The Sadun family’s 
power increased during the Tanzimat Period, when they were granted land titles for their tribe’s 
historically-held agricultural lands, or mukataa. In 1880, a conflict between the Sadun family and the 
Zuheyâde family led to Ottoman interference in the matter; as a result, many members of the Sadun 
family fled Iraq for the Syrian desert and the Ottoman government reduced Basrah’s status from 
wilayah to sançak, a lesser status than wilayah. A second crisis occurred when the exiled Sadun 
members returned to the Muntafiq region and demanded their former lands be returned to them.18 
The ‘Amarrah region in eastern part of the wilayah was controlled by the Albu Muhammad, 
Banu Lam, and Banu Asad tribal groups.19 The Banu Lam constituted of a powerful tribal group 
situated on the modern-day border of Iran and Iraq, with a population of about 45,000 in the early 
1900s. Given its position adjacent to Iran, since the seventeenth century the Banu Lam had often allied 
with their Shi‘i neighbors in Iran in its efforts to resist Ottoman control. In 1880, the Banu Lam rose 
up against the Ottomans in response to efforts to collect taxes. After the uprising had been suppressed, 
the Banu Lam remained relatively quiet for the remainder of the Ottoman period. Like the Banu Lam, 
the Albu Muhammad’s location put them between the modern-day states of Iran and Iraq. Unlike the 
Banu Lam, however, the Albu Muhammad posed a serious threat to their neighbors and to the 
Ottoman government due to the fact that they were well-armed with smuggled rifles from abroad and 
                                               
17. Ibid., 88. 
18. Ibid., 89. 
19. Nakash, The Shi‘is of Iraq, 25–6. In addition to the Muntafiq, the Banu Lam, the Albu Muhammad, and the 
Banu Asad, Yitzhak Nakash includes the Zubayd, the Dulaym, the ‘Ubayd, the Khaz‘al, the Rabi‘a, and the Ka’b among 
the main tribal groups in southern and central Iraq. 
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were well-positioned geographically, making them hard to attack or to control.20 South of ‘Amarrah in 
the marshy region between Qurnah and Suq ash-Shuyukh, lived the Shi‘i tribe of the Banu Asad. 
While under the control of Sheikh Hassan Khayyun, the Banu Asad became infamous for an incident 
on 24 August 1895, when the Ottoman government issued an imperial decree to banish Khayyun and 
the tribes of the al-Madina district for supposedly attacking an Ottoman steamer.21 
 
Socioeconomic changes in the tribal system 
 As previously mentioned, the Tanzimat Period significantly affected the tribal system 
throughout Mesopotamia. Influenced by these reforms, the governor of Baghdad, Midhat Paşa, 
introduced the Land Code of 1869 throughout the wilayat. Paşa sought to increase private ownership 
of agricultural lands by granting land titles to individuals. His objectives in doing so were to 
delegitimize communal land claims and lessen the power of tribes by privatizing the land, as prior to 
the Code, agricultural lands had been synonymous with tribal lands and had often been held by entire 
tribal groups.22 However, the Code worked contrary to Paşa’s objectives and, instead, the land policy 
created a powerful landed class by which the bulk of agricultural land was held by a small number of 
paramount sheikhs, ruling families, and other powerful individuals. As a result, tribesmen largely 
became tenant farmers, making tribal relations increasingly hierarchical.23 
                                               
20. Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 92–3. 
21. Ibid., 97. 
22. Nakash, The Shi‘is of Iraq, 34. 
23. Eric Davis, Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2005), 30. 
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 Following the changes in land ownership, several market forces, including Mesopotamia’s 
entrance into the world market, led to an increase in rural-to-urban migration. Not only were urban 
areas revived by the population growth and new industrialization, but the migration created what Eric 
Davis calls “crosscutting cleavages,” which is to say that the new social structures of the cities 
superseded the geographic- and ethnic-based identities of the tribal system.24 Another change that 
occurred in the cities was the rise in European-inspired nationalism and to counter it, which the 
Ottomans saw this as a threat to the viability of their control, the government sought to expand and 
update the military. Most of the new officers were Arabs who attended the Ottoman military academy 
in Istanbul and were Sunni Arabs from the “Sunni Arab triangle” from Baghdad north to Ramadi and 
Mosul. The development of the military during this time is significant not only for understanding later 
developments in the elite class of Mandatory Iraq, but also for the development of a political-military 
culture which would have long-lasting effects on the state bureaucracy throughout the period of 
monarchial rule.25 
 
The Shi‘i Arabs of Iraq 
 Prior to the nineteenth century, the Shi‘i Arabs would never have become a threat to the Sunni 
majority in the Mesopotamia Province.26 In the nineteenth century, however, mass conversions from 
Sunnism to Shi‘ism rapidly turned Shi‘i Arabs into the majority ethnoreligious group in Iraq. Yitzhak 
                                               
24. Ibid., 30–1. 
25. Ibid., 33. 
26. Nakash, The Shi‘is of Iraq, 25. 
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Nakash credits the conversion in the nineteenth century from nomadic to settled life, the rapid 
development of the Shi‘i shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala, and Ottoman tribal settlement policy as 
the likely explanation for why the conversions happened at that point in time and with such speed. 
Notable though, were the often “incomplete” nature of the conversions within tribal groups; this 
meant that by the time the monarchy was formed, Sunnism and Shi‘ism could not be defined by tribal 
groups nor by geographic region. The process was uneven and tribal groups ended up with tribesmen 
who were both Sunni and Shi‘i.27 As with the policies of the Tanzimat Period, the disjointed nature of 
the conversions and changes to the tribal system decreased the power of the paramount sheikhs and 
instead increased the power of the sirkals and the sayyids.28 The sayyids, local ruling individuals, took 
control of the religious and administrative functions of the tribe, which further sped up the rate of 
conversion to Shi‘ism.29 In 1920, it was estimated that Shi‘i Muslims constituted of about fifty-six 
percent of the population of Iraq.30 
 Modern-day Iraq is home to several significant Shi‘i shrine cities, where historically the most 
prominent Shi’i scholars resided and studied.31 These shrine cities, as Nakash describes them, were the 
“cultural-religious contact zone” between the Sunni Ottoman Empire, the Shi‘i Safavid Empire, and 
the Qajar Dynasty in Iran. Because of this, the shrine cities were a point of contention between the 
                                               
27. Ibid., 27–8. 
28. Ibid., 34. Upon realizing that his plan to undermine the power of tribes with the Land Code of 1969 had 
backfired, Midhat Paşa reversed the Code in 1881, banned any further granting of land deeds, and saw to it that the 
government repossess lands granted under the Code. This caused a major disruption to the tribal system and lessened the 
socioeconomic power of the paramount sheikhs, while increasing the power of the sirkals, and the religious and 
administrative power of the sayyids. 
29. Ibid., 37. 
30. Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 99. 
31. Nakash, The Shi‘is of Iraq, 13. 
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Ottomans and Iranians from the sixteenth to the twentieth century, when both empires sought to 
control Shi‘i affairs in the region. As a result, the shrine cities were far more developed by the time of 
the establishment of the monarchy in Iraq, with Shi‘i institutions, such as religious madaris (schools), 
far exceeding those of the Sunni religious institutions.32 The prominent shrine cities were—and remain 
to this day—Najaf, Karbala, Samarra, and Kadhimiyah. 
 Najaf was a semi-autonomous state on the Euphrates River in the northern region of the 
Basrah wilayah. It was often where the leading Shi‘i mujtahid of the day resided and practiced, and it 
is home to the tomb of Ali ibn Abi’ Ta’lib, the first imam of Shi‘ism.33 The city was mostly Arab, with 
about a third Persian. Najaf sits on the edge of the western desert of Iraq, and tribal affairs long held a 
strong influence on the city.34 In April of 1915, the tribal confederations expelled the Ottomans from 
the city and divided Najaf into four quarters. Sayyid Mahid, Hajji ‘Atiyya and Kazim Subbi of the 
Zuqurt ruled the Huwayyish, the ‘Amarrah, and the Buraq quarters; and Hajji Sa’d of the Shumurt 
ruled the Mishraq quarter. The sheikhs maintained this position of power until May 1918 when the 
British occupied Iraq. In 1803, the construction of the Hindiyyah canal by the Ottomans meant that 
Najaf was better able to sustain the huge numbers of pilgrims that came to the city each year and allow 
it to retain its position as the center of Shi‘ism in Iraq. Each year, so many pilgrims flocked to Najaf 
that at the beginning of the twentieth century, the regular influx of pilgrims often doubled its 
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population of about 30,000.35 Along with Karbala, Najaf was powerful enough that the Ottomans 
were unable to assert true control over the city.36 
 Karbala, about halfway between Najaf and Baghdad, is sacred in Shi‘ism, as it is the location of 
the Battle of Karbala in the seventh century. It also contains the shrines of Hussein ibn ‘Ali, the son of 
‘Ali and the third Shi‘i imam—known as the Sayyid al-Shuhada, the Prince of Martyrs, for his 
martyrdom at the Battle of Karbala—and of ‘Abbas, Hussein’s half-brother. Though Najaf eventually 
emerged as the preeminent center of religious study, Karbala developed before Najaf, at around 1737 
when the Husseiniyah canal was built.37 While Najaf acquiesced to Ottoman efforts to insert direct 
control (though as already mentioned, the Ottomans were never truly able to achieve this), the tribal 
groups of Karbala resisted the Ottomans and in retaliation, the Ottomans occupied the city and 
demoted Karbala from its semi-autonomous status. Karbala was home to a large Persian community 
and had strong connections with Iran, as is evidenced by the elite status of the Persianized Kammuna 
family.38 Kadhimiyah and Samarra did not hold the same paramount status as Najaf and Karbala but 
were important nonetheless. Kadhimiyah is just north of the city of Baghdad on the Tigris River and 
contains the shrines of Musa al-Kazim, the seventh imam, and his grandson, Muhammad al-Jawad, the 
ninth imam. Samarra contains the shrines of ‘Ali al-Hadi, the tenth imam, and his son, Hassan al-
‘Askari, the eleventh imam. Samarra is also believed to be the birthplace of the twelfth imam, 
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Muhammad al-Mahdi, who is believed to return as the Mahdi.39 Despite Samarra’s status as a Shi‘i 
shrine city, its population was almost entirely Sunni.40 
 By and large, Shi‘i Arabs in Mesopotamia did not recognize the Ottoman Empire’s claim to the 
Great Islamic Caliphate, which Sultan Abdülhamid II consistently emphasized to give his regime 
religious legitimacy. Further, many Shi‘i mujtahidun forbade participation in the Ottoman 
government, considering it heretical. In turn, the Ottoman government supported the idea that the 
Shi‘i Arabs in Mesopotamia should be regarded with a sense of distrust and disloyalty, as they were 
unlikely to recognize the legitimacy of nor identify with the Sunni Ottoman state.41 The Shi‘i tribes 
were often considered a “standing menace to law and order,” as they were often a source of frustration 
for the Ottoman government on matters such as taxation and conscription.42 
However, Mesopotamia was on the periphery of the Ottoman Empire, far from Istanbul, and 
therefore the sultan’s power was limited.43 Although control over land was a major source of conflict 
during Abdülhamid II’s sultanate, Abdülhamid was careful in how he dealt with the paramount 
sheikhs. This was different from the local governors’ approach to the sheikhs, which was not as 
cautious. The sultan would typically revert to force against the sheikhs only as a last option.44 There 
were certainly conflicts between the Ottoman government and the Shi‘i tribal groups, but, in the late 
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Ottoman period there is a lack of evidence of active discrimination towards Shi‘i Arabs in 
Mesopotamia and generally speaking, both parties only interacted with the other out of necessity.45 
Although there little to no proof of active conflict between the Shi‘i tribal groups and the Ottoman 
government, this does not mean that the Ottoman government did not harbor certain negative 
attitudes towards the Shi‘i Arabs. In a January 1908 report on the “Shi‘i problem” commissioned by 
the Ottoman government, the president of the commission, Mustafa Nâzim Paşa, laid out four 
conclusions on the steady and growing power of the Shi‘i Arabs in Iraq: one, the political influence of 
the Shi‘i mujtahidun over the uneducated, poor masses; two, the strength of the Shi‘i establishments, 
compared to the decay of the Sunni establishments; three, the political power of the Shi‘i ‘ulama; and 
four, the high enrollment of Shi‘i religious students, compared to the dismal attendance at Sunni 
religious schools.46 
 
THE BRITISH IN IRAQ 
The creation of the Mandate 
 With the knowledge that the Ottomans would likely enter the war on the side of the Central 
Powers in the impending world war and with the nascent threats from their forces in the Gulf, the 
British landed troops in al-Faw on 6 November 1914. By 22 November, the British troops had 
captured Basrah.47 On 11 March 1917, the British entered Baghdad and flew the Union Jack from the 
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clock tower in Qishla Square, marking the occupation of the city and the end of Ottoman rule in 
Mesopotamia.48 By 1918, the British had reached Mosul. Britain had three main reasons for 
maintaining control over Iraq: it sought to maintain a strong front in the face of international 
pressures, specifically its rivalry with France; to maintain access to India and the Suez Canal for 
military and economic purposes; and to assert control over the oil reserves in Mosul.49 
 It is important to note a few incidents at the beginning of the British occupation of Iraq which 
likely influenced the British’s decision for indirect over direct rule. At first, resistance to the British 
incursion was highly localized. Even when revolts spread across the Mesopotamia Province, the actual 
fighting remained local, with little inter-regional collaboration against the British. When the British 
invaded Basrah in 1914, the Shi‘i mujtahidun, led by Ayatollah al-Yazdi, declared a fatwa for jihad.50 In 
1916, the mujtahidun declared another fatwa and launched the Najaf Revolt. While these actions 
certainly gained the attention of the British, they failed to end British control in Iraq. The Iraqi Revolt 
from June to October 1920, however, did significantly impact the future of British policy in Iraq. 
With the news in April 1920 that Iraq had been assigned a mandate at the San Remo Conference, 
various contingents within Iraq began to organize. The Revolt began on 30 June 1920 when a sheikh 
in Rumaithah was imprisoned for refusing to repay an agricultural debt and his tribesmen rose up in 
support of him. With the anti-British sentiment throughout Iraq already simmering under the surface, 
the uprising quickly spread, though it still remained largely localized and disorganized. The British 
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forces finally regained control in October, but only after hundreds of deaths on both sides. While the 
Revolt failed to reach its ultimate objectives of dispelling the British from Iraq, it did make a strong 
case for indirect British rule with an Arab, “native” leader.51 
 
Faisal I’s road to Iraq 
In order to understand how Mesopotamia became Mandatory Iraq under the British in 1921, 
it is first necessary to go back to the early days World War I, but from the level of British dealings with 
the Arab powers, primarily those from the Gulf. Faisal I’s, the soon-to-be first king of Iraq, road to 
Iraq began in July 1915, when Sharif Hussein ibn ‘Ali of Mecca sent a letter to Sir Henry McMahon, 
High Commissioner to Egypt, laying out the conditions by which Hussein would commit troops and 
resources to the British effort to overthrow the Ottoman government. Their exchange continued until 
March 1916, when the two reached an agreement. This correspondence is the source of contention 
over whether or not McMahon, as representative for the British government, promised Hussein an 
independent Arab state in exchange for Hussein’s commitment to the Arab Revolt.52 In May 1916, 
just months after the conclusion of the correspondence, representatives of the British and French 
government met in secret. The two imperial powers divided up most of the Arab Middle East into 
spheres of influence; this agreement—the Sykes-Picot Agreement—seems to contradict the terms of 
the agreement that McMahon made with Hussein.53 
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On 10 June 1916, Hussein and his forces launched the Arab Revolt from Mecca. Over the 
next two years, the Sharifian Army led the revolt against the Ottoman Empire across the Middle East.54 
The Revolt effectively ended with a British/Arab victory when Hussein’s son, Emir Faisal I, led troops 
into Damascus on 1 October 1918. Faisal’s forces included a number of Iraqi ex-Ottoman officers and 
British military advisors, including Captain T.E. Lawrence.55 Unbeknownst to Hussein or Faisal, the 
British and the French had already decided upon the geographic boundaries of their respective spheres 
of influence in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, meaning that Faisal was violating the terms when he 
immediately began to set up an administration for an independent Arab state in Syria. In March 1920, 
a general Syrian congress met and declared Syria an independent Arab state with Faisal as its king.56 At 
the San Remo Conference in April 1920, the British and French assigned the Near Eastern Mandates, 
which included French-controlled Syria and British-controlled Iraq.57 On 20 July 1920, French forces 
entered Damascus, ending the short-lived Arab state and driving Faisal into exile in Europe.58 
Back in Iraq, the Civil Commissioner to Mesopotamia Sir Percy Cox wrote in “The Future of 
Mesopotamia” that in order for the people of Iraq to accept British rule, the British must ensure that 
any remnants of Ottoman rule in Mesopotamia be removed. He proposed British rule through a high 
commissioner with a figurehead “native” ruler. Before he could make significant strides in these 
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efforts, however, Cox was reassigned to Iran in July 1918 and his deputy, Arnold Talbot Wilson, was 
assigned to High Commissioner.59 At first, Wilson was resistant to the idea of an independent Iraq, 
but eventually conceded to conducting a plebiscite, authorized on 27 November 1918, to gauge Iraqi 
acceptance of British rule.60 Wilson sent officers to canvass for the plebiscite, and only in the shrine 
cities, according to Wilson, did they find any evidence of dissent against British rule.61 
 
Map 3: 
The divisions of the Arab Middle East according to the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916.62 
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 On the Iraqi end, in January of 1919, a contingent of four Iraqi Hizb al-‘Ahd al-Iraqi 
members, representing 385 Iraqi officers and civil servants working in Syria and the Hijaz, sent a letter 
to the British government demanding that they end the occupation and form an independent Iraqi 
state with one of Sharif Hussein’s sons as king.63 Additionally, they wrote, the new Iraqi state would 
have diplomatic relations with the other independent Arab states and remain allied with Great Britain. 
On 23 April 1919, the members of al-‘Ahd sent another letter, this time to the Foreign Officer in 
Aleppo, by way of the Allied liaison officer. The letter included the signature of Ja’far al-‘Askari, who 
was serving as the military governor in Aleppo at the time.64 In April 1919, a different group consisting 
of Sayyid ‘Alwan, Sayyid Nour al-Yasiri, and Sheikh ‘Abd al-Wahid met secretly in Najaf to discuss 
approaching Sharif Hussein with the request that he install one of his sons as the king of an 
independent Iraq. Many months later, Muhammad Ridha al-Shibibi, the representative for the group, 
finally reached Mecca to deliver the message to Hussein. Hussein in his response was vague but 
nonetheless clearly offered his support for their cause.65 
 On 8 March 1920, an Iraqi general congress led by al-‘Ahd met to coincide with the congress 
in Syria.66 The congress was supported from Syria by Faisal, who believed that the Iraqi congress would 
support his own monarchy in Syria and that his support would encourage the appointment of his 
brother, ‘Abdullah, as king of Iraq. At the congress, members openly called for an independent Iraqi 
state “from the north of Mosul wilayah to the Persian Gulf” with ‘Abdullah as king, and an end to the 
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British occupation, though Iraq would maintain diplomatic relations with Britain. Concurrently, an 
Iraqi contingent attended the Syrian congress, which, with the exception of one individual, were all 
Sunni ex-Ottoman military officers or notables. The Iraqi contingent in Syria, upon hearing of the 
tenets from the Iraqi congress, were upset to hear that the independent Iraqi state would maintain 
diplomatic relations with Britain; they saw this as merely replacing one occupier (the Ottomans) with 
another (the British).67 
 Following the Iraqi Revolt that ended in October 1920, the British officers in Mesopotamia, 
who were mostly reassigned from the India Office, were largely discredited. Included in this was the 
High Commissioner A.T. Wilson, to be replaced by Sir Percy Cox, whom the British brought back 
from his posting in Iran.68 On 1 October 1920, Cox landed in Basrah. Chief among his first 
responsibilities was to determine the structure of the new Iraqi state and the tenants of the Mandate to 
be laid out at the Cairo Conference.69 With the Revolt in recent memory, Cox knew that he had to 
cultivate a British policy that included Iraqi representation. The groups that would be included, he 
decided, were the urban elite from Baghdad and Basrah, the landed classes and paramount sheikhs, and 
Iraq’s minority groups, especially Iraqi Jews.70 On 11 October, he arrived in Baghdad and a day later, 
began laying the groundwork for the formation of the first Arab government and offered the 
premiership to the naqib of Baghdad, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kailani. On 23 October 1920, al-Kailani 
formed the first cabinet of the Iraqi government. Of its eight members, one was a Jewish notable and 
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another was the Shi‘i ex-Sharifian officer, Ja’far al-‘Askari. Despite the fact that this cabinet was 
independent in name, it was entirely dependent on the British for nearly all of its resources.71 
Cox’s other main concern was choosing an Arab king for Iraq. Quincy Wright, an American 
political scientist, wrote about the political decision behind indirect rule in an article published in 
1926. He writes: “Stimulated by serious insurrection in 1920, by parliamentary complaints of expense, 
by the advice of Arab sympathizers like Colonel Lawrence and Miss Gertrude Bell, and by the need of 
a place for the Emir Feisal, just expelled from Damascus by the French…” the British decided that a 
system of indirect rule was in their best interest if it were to maintain control over Iraq without serious 
insurrections. 72 At the Cairo Conference in March 1920, the British Mandatory powers decided what 
would become the three pillars of the Mandate would be the monarchy, the treaty, and the 
constitution. The first king of the monarchy would be Faisal I, the third son of the Sharif Hussein. 
The constitution would have democratic elements to incorporate Iraqi participation, specifically of 
the aforementioned groups that Cox laid out.73 Cox was keenly aware, just as he was before the Revolt, 
of the necessity of creating a positive public image for the British and for Faisal. Prior to Faisal’s arrival 
in Iraq, Cox ensured that any and all outspoken critics of the British and Faisal were removed from 
Iraq, including Sayyid Talib al-Naqib, who was arrested and deported to Ceylon (modern-day Sri 
Lanka) on 16 April 1921. Al-Naqib’s arrest and deportation seemed to have a calming effect on Iraq, 
and most of the dissent quieted down. 
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Days before Faisal’s arrival on 16 June 1921, the cabinet decided that Faisal should receive an 
official welcome in Basrah. Scrambling to form a welcoming party, the former assistant military 
governor of Aleppo and the governor of Baghdad, Naji al-Suwaidi, recruited sixty people in Baghdad 
to travel to Basrah at their own expense. When Faisal disembarked from the Northbrook in Basrah on 
23 June, he was met by this welcoming party, which included Ja’far al-‘Askari, a friend of Faisal’s, and 
Jack Philby, a known opponent of Faisal’s. Like the welcoming party, this was another strategic move 
by Cox to create a sense of impartiality and acceptance.74 On his way from Basrah to Baghdad, Faisal 
stopped by a number of other towns and cities, including Najaf and Karbala. His reception ranged 
from clearly staged to tepid. When he arrived in Baghdad on 29 June, he was met by huge crowds and 
was received by Sir Aylmer Haldane and a number of other officials.75 Despite all of the efforts that 
Cox made to create a warm welcome for Faisal in Iraq, the artificiality of it all was no more obvious 
than in the lack of infrastructure in the new capital of Baghdad. In the words of Ali A. Allawi: 
“Baghdad had not been a true capital city since the collapse of the Abbasid Empire in 1258... Faisal’s 
new capital was to all intents and purposes a medieval city with a smattering of modernity 
superimposed on it.”76 
On 11 July 1921, the Iraqi cabinet passed a resolution that designated Faisal as king of Iraq. 
Cox, again aware of possible dissent and diligent in covering all of his bases, required that the 
resolution could only be approved following another plebiscite.77 The plebiscite took about two weeks 
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and at the end of July, they had their answer: the Ministry of Interior announced that ninety-six 
percent had voted in favor of Faisal. This number, however, is misleading. Though the majority of the 
Iraqi elite approved of Faisal, the landslide number was also reflective of Cox flexing his power over the 
situation to ensure a positive outcome.78 On 23 August 1921, Faisal was enthroned. The date, chosen 
specially by Faisal, coincided with 18 Dhu’l-Hijja of the Hijri calendar, the Day of al-Ghadir.79 This 
was a strategic move by Faisal to show his support for the Shi‘i Arabs of Iraq.80 Though Faisal was 
formally Sunni, he was adept in navigating the complexities of the Iraqi ethnoreligious makeup, and 
quickly made efforts to approach the Shi‘i community.81 He was also keen to retain some semblance of 
independence from the British. Notably, he refused to announce his subordination to Britain in his 
accession speech; when the Colonial Office insisted upon this, Faisal nearly refused the throne and 
eventually compromised, agreeing that he would relent on his demands for a clear definition of his role 
as king in exchange for not declaring his subordination.82 
 
Iraq under the Mandate 
 The legal terms of the British Mandate in Iraq were established in the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 
1922. From early April through July 1922, Shi‘i ‘ulama in Karbala led protests against the Treaty.83 
These protests very nearly became a real threat to the Treaty were it not for Faisal falling ill with a bout 
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of appendicitis on 24 August. With Faisal indisposed, Cox assumed full powers and saw to it that the 
leaders of the anti-Treaty protests were exiled to the island of Hajjam in the Persian Gulf, ending the 
opposition. On 10 October 1922, Cox persuaded the prime minister to sign the Treaty, which was 
ratified in June 1924. The treaty was to last 20 years.84 
 The government established by the British Mandatory powers was overwhelmingly Sunni 
Arab. Faisal was less familiar with the Iraqi officer corps than he was with Syria’s, and he largely created 
his officer corps from the ex-Ottoman and ex-Sharifian Army officers who served with him during the 
Arab Revolt and/or in Damascus.85 Despite the efforts Faisal made to reach out to the Shi‘i 
communities, the cabinet’s official stance toward the Shi‘i Arabs was that, until Iraq gained 
independence, there was no place for Shi‘i voices in the government.86 Faisal actively pursued 
incorporating the Mosul wilayah into the Mandate not only for its oil reserves, but also for its 
predominantly Sunni Muslim population. Without its incorporation, it would be difficult for Faisal 
and his cabinet to retain its legitimacy as Sunni rulers over a majority Shi‘i Arab population.87 With 
Mosul, at least, the demographics would even out slightly. The question of the wilayah was eventually 
handed off to the League of Nations, then to the Permanent Court of International Justice, which in 
1925 decided that Mosul was to be incorporated into Mandatory Iraq.88 
Though the British idealized the rural population in Orientalist terms as the “unspoiled 
Arabs,” their image of the divisions between the rural and urban populations was not consistent with 
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the historical developments of the nineteenth century which, as discussed earlier, included mass 
migration to the cities and interrupted the traditional geographical associations of tribal groups. 
Despite this rhetoric, though, the British ultimately depended and capitalized upon the vestiges of the 
administrative hierarchies of the Ottoman Empire, which were almost exclusively Sunni Arabs at the 
top and which actively excluded Shi‘i Arabs, especially the paramount sheikhs and the mujtahidun 
that had historically caused problems for the Ottoman government.89 For the Shi‘i Arabs themselves, 
the fatwas of the early days of the British occupation in Iraq left a lasting impression on the British 
officials. 
A 1920 letter by Gertrude Bell, Oriental Secretary to Mandatory Iraq under Percy Cox, to her 
mother is indicative of the attitudes the British harbored against the Shi‘i Arab religious clergy: “There 
they sit with an atmosphere which reeks of antiquity and is so thick with the dust of ages that you can’t 
see through it–or can they. And for the most part they are very hostile to us, a feeling we can’t alter 
because it’s so difficult to get at them.”90 The rhetoric of the “unspoiled Arabs” is noticeably absent 
here as Bell reveals the private views toward the rural elite. While the mujtahidun and ‘ulama were 
constantly at odds with the powers that be, before the establishment of the Mandate, the various 
sheikhdoms often pandered to whichever power, be that British or Ottoman, they believed would best 
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secure their economic interests.91 In Basrah, for example, several prominent notables sent a letter to 
King George V calling for the establishment of Basrah as a British protectorate.92 Following the 
establishment of the Mandate, however, the voices and actions of the Shi‘i mujtahidun overshadowed 
that of any Shi‘i tribesmen, notables, or merchants partial to the British. 
 The second Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, signed in June 1930, laid the conditions for the relationship 
between Britain and Iraq following Iraq’s independence, which was set for 1932. Unlike the 1922 
Treaty, which faced several protests and roadblocks, Nuri al-Sa’id, the prime minister, and the British 
contingent, were quick to negotiate the terms of the agreement. The terms were as follows: the king is 
responsible for the internal order of the country; Iraq is responsible for its own defense, which set up 
the establishment of the Iraqi Air Force; Britain retained the right to access Iraq’s military facilities and 
in the case of war, had the right to move troops through Iraq; Iraqi military equipment and advisers 
would come from Britain; Iraq’s two military bases would be in Habbaniyyah and Shu‘aiba; and the 
Treaty would last 25 years.93 
 
Independent Iraq 
 On 3 October 1932, the Mandate ended, and Iraq became independent to little fanfare.94 Prior 
to Iraq’s (quasi-)independence, Faisal wrote an eight-page memorandum that he sent to leading 
politicians throughout Iraq. A document such as this was unprecedented in Iraq’s history, and likely 
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elsewhere in the Arab world. In it, Faisal laid out his sincere thoughts on the primary issues of the 
country and its future.95 He wrote that the years of exclusion and oppression under Ottoman rule 
created a division between the Sunnis and Shi‘is. He states: 
All of this has made this majority [the Shi‘a], or at least certain individuals amongst them with 
personal ambitions, including religious leaders, and those who unworthily seek positions in 
government, or have not benefited materially from the new order, to appear as if they are still 
oppressed simply because they are Shi‘a.96 
 
Faisal warns about the continuation of this practice in future Iraqi policies, fearing that it would only 
increase the power of the Shi‘i leaders, whose power could potentially incite a popular insurrection 
against the Iraqi government. He continues, “They entice this majority to abandon the new state on 
the grounds that it is an unmitigated evil, and we must not ignore the effects that such people have on 
the simple but ignorant people.”97 
At the same time that Faisal wrote this memorandum, many of the former opposition leaders 
to the Treaty became officials in the cabinet. Among them was Rashid ‘Ali al-Kailani, who became 
prime minister in March 1933. Rashid ‘Ali and the other leaders were part of al-Ahali Group, a radical 
political group of mostly young elite from Iraq. Publicly, the members of al-Ahali supported the 
Treaty and its terms, but privately, they worked to undermine its legitimacy.98 Many members of this 
group would play further roles in the period following the 1936 coup d’état. Faisal’s monarchy came 
to an end with his sudden death on 8 September 1933. Faisal had been sick for some time and it is 
                                               
95. Allawi, Faisal I of Iraq, 536. 
96. Ibid., 537–8. 
97. Ibid. 
98. Ibid., 551. 
Bader 40 
likely that the stress of the Assyrian Crisis in August led to his sudden heart attack the next month.99 
Faisal’s twenty-one-year-old son, Ghazi, assumed the throne. Unlike Faisal, Ghazi was far less 
charismatic and comfortable in navigating the ethnoreligious complexities of Iraq.100 
 
Map 4: 
The borders of the newly-independent Iraq in 1932.101 
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POLITICAL AND CIVIL UNREST: THE ERA OF COUPS 
Ghazi’s monarchy 
 Tribal unrest continued after Faisal I’s death and Ghazi’s ascent to the throne. The roots of the 
tribal unrest were in the declining power of the paramount sheikhs that began with Britain's incursion 
into Mesopotamia over fifteen years earlier.102 Much like the attitude towards the Ottoman Empire, 
the majority of the Shi‘i mujtahidun refused to recognize the Hashemite Monarchy as legitimate since 
it was officially secular, dominated by Sunni Arabs, and exercised by a foreign power: the British. A 
tribal rebellion in Daghghara, near the shrine city of Najaf forced King Ghazi’s hand in replacing his 
cabinet of mostly Sunni Arabs.103 As tribal unrest grew more acute, the control of the state and of the 
army also grew. By 1936, the armed forces grew to about 23,000 members, which was double its size in 
1933. The Iraqi Air Force grew to an entire squadron. The military introduced a nationalist 
paramilitary training program called futuwa.104 The growth of the army occurred as Prime Minister 
Yasin al-Hashimi’s authoritarian regime rapidly became more akin to a dictatorship over a 
constitutional premiership.105 
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The 1936 coup d’état 
 With the deepening fractures of Yasin al-Hashimi’s regime, Bakr Sidqi and Hikmat Sulaiman 
planned a coup d’état. Though the coup came to be known as led by Sidqi, the coup was really the 
brainchild of Sulaiman, whose objectives in carrying out the coup were not only to seize power, but 
also to stimulate social and economic development, and adopt policies of secularism and 
modernization that were inspired by Kemal Atatürk’s government in Turkey.106 By 1935, Sulaiman 
and other major political players, such as Ja’far Abu al-Timman, had joined al-Ahali Group. The 
leaders of the coup obtained a pledge of support from the first division commander of the Iraqi Air 
Force and shortly thereafter on 29 October 1936, the army marched on Baghdad under Bakr Sidqi’s 
leadership and planes flew over the city, dropping leaflets demanding Hashimi’s resignation and the 
appointment of Sulaiman as prime minister. Once it was clear that the coup was only intended to 
replace the cabinet and not the monarchy, Ghazi conceded to their demands, al-Hashimi resigned, and 
Ghazi appointed Sulaiman as prime minister. The next day, al-Hashimi, Nuri al-Sa’id, and Rashid ‘Ali 
al-Kailani fled the country; Hashimi died of a heart attack in 1937 but the other two would soon 
return to Iraq.107 
 The Bakr Sidqi coup only served to reinforce the growing power and influence of the armed 
forces. Sidqi, as commander of the armed forces, was possibly even more powerful than Sulaiman. He 
violently suppressed any tribal uprisings in the same manner than he handled the Assyrian Crisis in 
1933. The Shi‘i Arabs in Iraq detested him and his command. From his exile in Egypt, Nuri al-Sa’id 
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campaigned against the regime and on 11 August 1937, an Iraqi officer, following commands from the 
Arab nationalist officers in exile, assassinated Sidqi at a military airfield near Mosul. With Sidqi’s 
assassination, civil war between the two factions led by Sulaiman and by Sa’id seemed imminent, 
especially once most of the officer corps sided with the Arab nationalist officers led by Sa’id in exile. 
On 17 August 1937, Sulaiman and his cabinet resigned.108 
 
The 1941 coup d’état and the second British occupation 
 On 4 April 1939, King Ghazi died in a car crash while driving under the influence of alcohol. 
His death created a power vacuum as he left his infant son, Faisal II, as king. On 6 April, ‘Abd al-Ilah 
was appointed regent.109 Just a few months later World War II broke out. On 10 June 1940, the British 
requested that Iraq break off diplomatic relations with Italy. The Iraqi cabinet was highly divided on 
the issue, with the anti-British side led by the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Amin al-Husseini and the 
Golden Square officers.110 In November of 1940, the British presented Iraq with an ultimatum that 
essentially forced Rashid ‘Ali out as prime minister and gave Taha al-Hashimi the power to form a new 
government. On 1 April 1941, Rashid ‘Ali and the Golden Square staged a coup d’état and ‘Ali 
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became prime minister once again. Nine days later, ‘Ali’s government deposed of ‘Abd al-Ilah, Faisal 
II’s regent, and replaced him with a distant relative, Sharif Sharaf.111 
 Later that month, the British demanded to land troops in Iraq, which the British retained the 
right to do under the Anglo-Iraqi Agreement of 1930. ‘Ali agreed, and on 17 and 18 April, the British 
troops landed at Basrah.112 On 2 May, while attempting to evacuate women and children in 
Habbaniyyah, the British were told by the Iraqi armed forces that if a plane left the ground, they 
would be fired upon. The British took this as an act of war and a British commander led troops to 
attack local Iraqi forces. By 19 May, the British forces captured Fallujah, and on 29 May 1941, the 
British marched on Baghdad, marking the beginning of the second British occupation. The Golden 
Square fled to Iran and was soon followed by Rashid ‘Ali and the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem.113 On 1 
June 1941, the deposed ‘Abd al-Ilah and Nuri al-Sa’id returned to Baghdad and on 9 October, the 
British asked al-Sa’id to form a new government.114 
 Between 1941 and 1953, there were constant changes in the Iraqi government, as grabs for 
power led to a continuous stream of various premierships. On 24 May 1953, Faisal II came of age. The 
next year, Nuri al-Sa’id returned to power and began the systematic suppression of all political activity. 
Though the armed forces and military officers were largely absent from politics in the postwar years, 
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the February 1955 Baghdad Pact, which was pro-Western and pro-British, ended the Anglo-Iraqi 
Treaty of 1930, incited Egyptian opposition and caused agitation among largely pro-Nasserist Iraqi 
army.115 This incited anti-regime sentiments among the armed forces and in February 1957, the anti-
regime opposition parties cultivated ties to the armed forces and formed the United National Front, 
which included the Istiqlal (Independence) Party, the National Democratic Party (NDP), the Iraqi 
Communist Party (ICP), and the Ba’th Party.116 
 
The 1958 coup d’état: “The July 14 Revolution” 
 The 1958 coup d’état was led by the Free Officers, which was founded by Rif‘at al-Hajj Sirri in 
the 1950s.117 The Free Officers was a secret military group that had pan-Arab objectives and consisted 
of mostly Sunni Arab officers.118 In 1957, Brigadier ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim was asked to join the 
Supreme Committee of the Free Officers as chairman, along with Colonel ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif.119 In 
early 1958, the Free Officers agreed that Iraq should become a republic and that the old elite should be 
purged from the government and put on trial for corroboration with the imperialist Western powers. 
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They also decided that the government should be controlled by the Revolutionary Command Council 
(RCC) of the Supreme Committee. On 14 July 1958, Qasim and ‘Arif ordered their forces to occupy 
Baghdad and ‘Arif announced over Baghdadi radio that the Free Officers were forming an Iraqi 
republic. Troops then marched on the royal palace, the Royal Guard surrendered and King Faisal II, 
Crown Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah, and other members of the royal family were coerced from the building and 
shot and killed, thus ending the Hashemite Monarchy. The next day, Nuri al-Sa’id was captured and 
killed in the streets.120 
THE BA’TH PARTY AND THE RISE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN 
 The Ba’th Party was founded in Syria in the 1940s, with a branch in Iraq. Since 1955, the Iraqi 
branch was led by Fu‘ad al-Rikabi, a Shi‘i Arab from Nasiriyyah.121 The Ba’th Party was founded on 
pan-Arab and secular ideals, with the motto “freedom, unity, socialism.”122 The Ba’thists were critical 
of socioeconomic inequalities in the Arab world and appealed to a younger generation of Shi‘i Arabs 
who were critical of the Shi‘i mujtahidun and landowners, and the Sunni Arab nationalist elite.123 In 
October 1959, the Ba’thists, including a young Saddam Hussein, attempted to assassinate ‘Abd al-
Karim Qasim. The event resulted in a purge of the Ba’thists from political activity and in 
demonstrations in support of the “sole leader” of Iraq.124 The same year, ‘Ali Salih al-Sa’di returned to 
Iraq to rebuild the Ba’th Party, and by 1962, he effectively was the head of the Party in Iraq.125 
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The 1963 coup d’état 
 In 1962, the Ba’th Party established the Military Bureau, which was a tool it planned to use to 
overthrow the Qasim regime.126 During the winter of 1961–2, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) 
even offered a ceasefire to the pan-Arab groups and the Ba’th Party if they overthrew the Qasim 
regime.127 Upon hearing of this conspiracy to overthrow his government, Qasim arrested ‘Ali Salih al-
Sa’di and Salih Mahdi ‘Ammash. For fear of a much larger purge, the remaining officers initiated the 
coup on 8 February 1963, and assassinated Brigadier Jalal al-Awqati, attacked and neutralized the 
Rashid military base, and marched on Baghdad. The next day, Qasim was captured and killed.128 
 
The Ba’thist government, 1963–8 
 With the Ba’thists in control of the government, ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif served as president of the 
armed forces, Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr as president of the Party, and ‘Ali Salih al-Sa’di as the head of the 
Party in Iraq, the deputy prime minister, and the minister of the interior. For the remainder of the year 
following the coup, the Ba’thists carried out ruthless purges of members of the ICP, killing or 
expelling about 3,000 people.129 Amid these purges, al-Bakr and al-Sa’di were sure to create a strong 
and powerful militia as a protection against any grabs for power by the Military Bureau. The purge 
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itself was primarily carried about by al-Hars al-Qawami, the Ba’thist National Guard, which was 
commanded by Colonel Mundhir Tawfiq al-Wandawi. Under al-Wandawi’s leadership, the National 
Guard grew to over 30,000 members and largely served as the armed militia for the Ba’thists, rather 
than as a national armed guard.130 In the summer of 1964, Hassan al-Bakr appointed Saddam Hussein 
as secretary to the RCC, where he was tasked with “reconstructing” the Party, ultimately giving 
Saddam the ability to command the Party as a whole by force.131 In April 1966, ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif 
died in a helicopter crash and General ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Arif, his brother, replaced him as president of 
the Party.132 
 
The 1968 coup d’état: “The July 17 Revolution” 
 On 17 July 1968, Brigadier Sa’id Slaibi of the Republican Guard, which was a mostly non-
Ba’thist elite unit of the armed forces, left the country. In his absence, three senior officers, ‘Abd al-
Razzaq al-Najif, Ibrahim ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Da’ud, and Sa’dun Ghaidan carried out a coup, arresting 
most of the cabinet, including Prime Minister Tahir Yahya and President ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Arif. The 
new government appointed Hassan al-Bakr as president, ‘Abd al-Razzaq al-Najif as prime minister, 
Hardan al-Tikriti as chief of staff and commander of the air force, and Sa’dun Ghaidan as commander 
of the Republican Guard. Just a couple of weeks later on 30 July, while under the command of al-
Bakr, the commander of the Baghdad garrison and a kinsman of al-Bakr’s, Hammad Shihab al-Tikriti , 
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seized control of the government and exiled ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Da’ud, who was out of the country at 
the time, and ‘Abd al-Razzaq al-Najif.133 
 
The Ba’thist government, 1968–79 
 The Ba’thist regime rapidly came to be controlled by a relatively small group of Sunni Arab 
army officers from the same region in the north of Iraq. Even more so, in the years following the 1963 
coup, more and more power was concentrated in the hands of officers from the small town of Tikrit, 
the hometown of Saddam Hussein and Hassan al-Bakr, who was then the president, prime minister, 
chairman of the RCC, and the secretary-general of the Ba’th Party.134 In 1968, al-Bakr and Saddam led 
the first of several more purges. In this instance, the purge was of ICP members, communists, and 
other suspected dissidents and critics of the regime.135 Saddam, then vice president, controlled Iraq 
through intimidation, often deploying the Ba’thist militia to patrol and control the streets.136 In 1970, 
Bakr and Saddam further consolidated power into their hands and into a tighter kinship network of 
the Albu Nasir tribe of Tikrit by dismissing Hardan al-Tikriti and Salih Mahdi ‘Ammash. Al-Hardan 
was exiled to Kuwait and was murdered in March of 1971.137 As historian Hanna Batatu remarks, “the 
Tikritis rule through the Ba’th Party, rather than the Ba’th Party through the Tikritis.”138 
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In February 1969, the shah of Iran reopened the question of the Shatt al-Arab, the waterway 
that runs along the border of Iran and Iraq.139 In April, al-Bakr attempted to persuade an influential 
Iraqi Shi‘i mujtahid Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim to publicly condemn the Iranian government in 
order to gain an advantage in the negotiations over the Shatt al-‘Arab. When Hakim refused, Bakr took 
violent measures against the Shi‘i population under the guise of a “discovered Iranian threat.” The 
following year, another supposed plot was discovered by al-Bakr’s government and more prominent 
Shi‘i Arabs, in addition to any Sunni Arabs associated with the growing Islamic organizations in Iraq, 
were expelled from the country. The Iraqi Shi‘ite Arabs saw these expulsions of the supposed 
“Iranians” in Iraq as a clear attack on the Shi‘i population as a whole, but in particular, members of al-
Da’wa.140 Around the same time, Ayatollah al-Hakim died and Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr filled 
his position. Many senior ‘ulama considered Sadr “dangerously radical.” Nevertheless, he obtained this 
highly influential and powerful position.141 
In addition to these purges, al-Bakr, Saddam, and the heads of the Ba’th Party attempted to 
undermine the Shi‘i kinship networks throughout Iraq by creating a system of patronage and loyalty 
to the Ba’th Party.142 In June of 1972, Nadhim Kazar, the Shi‘i Iraqi who, since 1969, had served as the 
head of the al-Amn al-‘Amm, the state security apparatus, attempted to stage a coup. The coup failed, 
and Saddam used the incident to incite yet another purge against supposed dissidents and ordered 
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Sa’dun Shakir and Barzan al-Tikriti to take over the al-Amn al-‘Amm.143 After some years as vice 
president (nominally, at least, but in reality, the head of the Party and the government), Saddam 
arranged to have al-Bakr confer the rank of general upon him in January of 1976. Saddam’s default to 
shows of force was again apparent in February of the following year, when rioting in Najaf and 
Karbala led to an al-Da’wa-led demonstration during the ‘Ashura, which grew to as large as 30,000 
people.144 As Saddam’s power within the Party and throughout Iraq grew, so did the rumors 
surrounding al-Bakr’s health and ability to lead the Party. Saddam strategically began to cultivate and 
secure his loyalties within his own patronage network, Ahl al-Thiqa, or the People of Trust, since he 
was mistrusted not only by the general public but also in political circles at this time.145 From the 
winter of 1978 to the spring of 1979, Saddam carried out one final purge of the Ba’th Party before 
ascending to the presidency.146 On 16 July 1979, al-Bakr unexpectedly announced his resignation as 
president. Just hours later, Saddam was sworn in as president and appointed ‘Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri as 
his vice president, deputy chairman of the RCC, and assistant secretary-general of the Regional 
Command; and Taha Ramadan al-Jazrawi as first deputy prime minister.147 
  
                                               
143. Ibid., 209. 
144. Ibid., 216. In Shi‘ism, ‘Ashura is the Day of Remembrance during the Mourning of Muharram. ‘Ashura 
commemorates the martyrdom of Hussein ibn ‘Ali, the third Shi‘i imam, who was killed at the Battle of Karbala in 680. 
145. Ibid., 218. 
146. Ibid., 220. 








Power, Patronage, and Propaganda: 





Formally, Saddam served as president from July of 1979, when Hassan al-Bakr suddenly 
resigned, to April of 2003, when the regime collapsed following the U.S.-led invasion. Informally, 
however, his influence and power extended beyond the years he was president. This chapter will first 
discuss the key events of his regime, specifically the Iran-Iraq War, the occupation of Kuwait and 
subsequent Gulf War, and finally, the interwar years leading up to the U.S. invasion. Second, this 
chapter will examine the pillars of power on which Saddam’s regime rested. These historical events, 
combined with Saddam’s pillars of power, had an undeniable influence and effect on the course of the 
Iraq War, which will be analyzed in the following chapter. 
 
THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, 1980–8 
Consolidation of power 
Four days before Hassan al-Bakr abruptly resigned and Saddam ascended to the presidency on 
12 July 1979, a Shi‘i member of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and the Regional 
Command by the name of Muhyi al-Din ‘Abd al-Hussein al-Mashhadi was arrested for alleged actions 
against the Ba’th Party. On 22 July, Muhyi al-Din made a public confession (likely under coercion of 
torture) that was broadcasted on Iraqi television. In it, he said that he and others in the Party actively 
plotted against the al-Bakr/Hussein regime. Then, on 28 July, at a meeting of the Ba’th Party, Saddam 
announced that he had discovered a plot against the Party of Syrian design and executed by high-
ranking officials of the RCC, and named sixty-eight co-conspirators of Muhyi al-Din’s, most of whom 
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were in the room. One-by-one, these alleged co-conspirators were rounded up and arrested, and 
twenty-two eventually executed, including Muhyi al-Din. During this period, an estimated 500 Party 
members were executed, and more were pushed out of the Party or demoted from their ranking.148 
This event was Saddam’s final purge of the Ba’th Party before the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War less 
than a year later. This, along with the fact that when he ascended to the presidency, Saddam named 
himself the Secretary General of the Party Regional Command, chairman of the RCC, commander-in-
chief of the armed forces and field marshal, signaled that he would create his “personal autocracy” at 
the expense of anyone who dared to show any sign of dissent.149 
 
Outbreak of the war 
After fifteen years of living in exile, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned to Iran on 1 
February 1979. Triumphant following the Iranian Revolution, Khomeini declared Iran an Islamic 
Republic. The Islamic Revolution in Iran was a clear threat to Iraq, though Iraq still formally 
recognized the new Islamic Republic of Iran. Saddam and Khomeini, however, were men at odds: in 
October of 1978, Saddam acquiesced to Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, the Iranian Shah’s request to expel 
Khomeini from Najaf, where he had been living in exile. Within Iraq, the Revolution mobilized Shi‘i 
political groups that had been outlawed under Saddam, such as al-Da’wa. Saddam quickly moved to 
suppress the actions of these groups so as to prevent them from gaining traction within Iraq.150 The 
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threat from the East was amplified during the summer of 1979, when Iraqi security forces clashed with 
many of the same political groups and underground movements that the Islamic Revolution has 
resurrected.151 Saddam’s fears and Khomeini’s charges to the Shi‘i Iraqis to bring the Revolution to 
Iraq came to a head when the KDP, led by the powerful Barzani tribe, crossed into Iraqi territory from 
Iran, directly violating the 1975 Algiers Agreement regarding the Shatt al-Arab. The Revolution 
sparked fear in Saddam, not only because of the long-held prejudices by Sunni Arabs in Iraq of the 
Shi‘i Persians in Iran, but also because of concerns that the Revolution would spill over into Iraqi 
territory and create Iranian hegemony over Iraq.152 
Saddam capitalized on the rhetoric of an “Arab world” with Iraq at the forefront in an attempt 
to gain the support of the Sunni Arabs and the Arab world at large. Khomeini’s clear influence and 
power worried Saddam and in the time leading up to the war with Iran, Saddam presented himself as 
the protector for the Arab world against Iran, but also specifically for the Gulf states.153 Iraqi fears of 
Iranian hegemony did not begin with the 1979 Islamic Revolution, but rather went back to historical 
border disputes that erupted at the beginning of the twentieth century. In addition to the Shatt al-
Arab—of which Iran had controlled half of since 1975—Iraq claimed to have the right to the “Arab 
land” of Khuzestan, a large swath of southern Iran on the border with Iraq that had access to the Shatt 
al-Arab and to the Persian Gulf via many miles of coastline. The province of Khuzestan had been 
under Iranian control since 1925. Specifically, Iraq zeroed in on the city of Khorramshahr, known in 
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Iraq by its Arabic name, Muhammara, a key port city on the shores of the Shatt al-Arab that had been 
in Iran’s possession since 1937.154 
 
The first stage of the war: The war of provocation 
On 4 September 1980, Iran shelled the cities of Khanaqin and Mandali from the disputed 
region of Zain al-Qaws. When Iran shelled the two cities again on 17 September, Saddam announced 
that he was officially abrogating the 1975 Shatt al-Arab agreement and that the Shatt would return to 
Iraqi sovereignty. On 19 September, Iran attacked Iraq again. In addition to hitting residential areas 
along the Shatt, the attack also hit foreign merchant ships. In the first act of military retaliation, 
Saddam launched a bombing mission on 22 September that destroyed ten Iranian air bases and two 
early warning stations. This was the prelude to many “scorched earth” military strategies employed by 
Saddam that were intended to destroy Iran’s military capabilities. The next day, Iraq began its military 
advance into Iran. The Iraqi armed forces made quick territorial advances into Iran and by 28 
September, Saddam announced a ceasefire, assuming that Iraq’s advances would coerce Khomeini to 
accept the ceasefire and make concessions. Khomeini, to Saddam’s surprise, refused the ceasefire, and 
the war continued. What Saddam had not anticipated was that the Iraqi attacks would mobilize 
Iranians, who saw the Iraqi assaults as threats to the Revolution.155 Further, Khomeini pushed the 
rhetoric that Iranians would be protecting the history of Iran itself by taking up arms in the fight 
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against Iraq.156 Then, in June 1982, Saddam tried again to end the war by announcing that Iraq would 
withdraw to the internationally-determined borders, claiming that it had reached its objective in 
destroying Iran’s military structure—which few actually believed. When Iran refused to accept Iraq’s 
withdrawal, it launched the two countries into the next stage of the war.157 
 
The second stage of the war: The war of attrition 
 The second stage of the war lasted from 1982 to 1986. The most significant outcome for either 
side was the depletion of resources. This stage of the war is also significant for Iraq’s use of chemical 
weapons, which possibly began as early as August of 1983. Reports of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, 
however, did not reach the outside world until 1984. These reports, from the battle for Majnun during 
Operation Kheibar, said that Iraq had launched a defensive assault against Iranian forces that used 
chemical weapons. Majnun is a series of artificial islands that Iraq built to support the Majnun oil 
fields near al-Qurnah in the south of the country. Capturing Majnun—or at least damaging it—was a 
strategic move by Iran to upset Iraq’s oil-based economy.158 This, again, was just a prelude to Saddam’s 
brutal use of chemical weapons. 
Despite Iraq’s heavy use of chemical weapons in this stage of the war, Saddam still successfully 
campaigned for the support of the international community. In 1983, France loaned Iraq five Super 
Étendard war planes that were equipped with Exocet missiles.159 The Iraqis even repaired their 
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fractured relationships with the U.S.S.R. to receive shipments of Soviet arms, including Soviet Scud 
missiles.160 The U.S. became involved in the war when it launched Operation Staunch in the spring of 
1983. In addition to receiving military support, the U.S.’s alliance with Iraq meant that it allowed—
even turned a blind eye—to the flow of arm shipments into Iraq during the course of the war. With 
the exception of “Irangate,” the United States’ support lasted until the end of the war in 1988.161 
 
The third stage of the war: The war of terror 
 The third stage of the war was arguably the most brutal stage of the war. Unlike previous Iraqi-
led assaults, which focused mainly on Iran’s military installations, in this stage of the war Saddam 
focused the attacks on civilian populations. When Iran seized Majnun in 1986 and attempted to seize 
Basrah in 1987, Iraq launched several attacks on the Kurdish-controlled Halabjah region of Iraq in 
May and June of 1987. The attacks used chemical weapons and killed upwards of 4,000 people, mostly 
civilians.162 Less than a year later, on 29 February 1988, Iraq launched the Anfal Campaign in Iraqi 
Kurdistan.163 The Anfal Campaign was an Iraqi offensive that focused on peshmerga-controlled areas 
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in the Kurdish north of Iraq.164 The Campaign was first time that Iraq used chemical weapons for the 
intent purpose of attacking a civilian population. The pattern of the attacks were as follows: first, a 
focused assault on peshmerga-strongholds, primarily in the Balisan Valley, used a mix of chemical 
weapons and high-explosive air attacks; second, the remaining villagers were cleared out and men were 
separated from women, children, and the elderly, who were put in mass holding camps of horrific 
condition; the men were reportedly shot en masse and buried in mass graves; and third, the villages 
were destroyed, often following looting by the Fursan.165 The worst attack of the Campaign was on 16 
March 1988, a day after Iran captured Halabjah, when Iraqi armed forces dropped a mixture of nerve 
and mustard gas on the city, killing between 3,500 and 5,000 people.166 According to some Kurdish 
sources, nearly 1,300 villages were destroyed.167 In total, the Anfal Campaign killed somewhere 
between 50,000 to 100,000 people.168 
 At this point in the war, both sides were running out of money, material resources, and 
manpower. The next major offensive by Iran was in the February of 1986, when it captured al-Faw. In 
early 1987, Iranian forces attempted to seize Basrah, but were unsuccessful.169 In February of 1988, 
Iraq launched the “war of terror” on Iranian cities. Starting on 22 February, it launched over 200 
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missiles into Iran, with 150 aimed at Tehran alone. On 15 March, Iran seized Halabjah, which was 
followed by the aforementioned counterattack by Iraq. In mid-April, at the beginning of Ramadan, 
Iraq launched a surprise attack on Iranian forces at al-Faw. Within four days, Iraqi forces had 
recaptured the city. By June, Iraq had recaptured Majnun and in July, advanced into Iranian territory 
while the U.S. increased their naval offensives against Iran.  At this point in the war, United Nations 
Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar had already commissioned an investigation into the Iran-Iraq 
War. In July of 1987, the U.N. adopted U.N. Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 598. However, it 
was not until a year later, on 17 July 1988, that Iran delivered their letter of acceptance to the Secretary 
General in New York.170 The following day, Iraq also accepted the terms of the agreement, but not 
before Saddam gave a speech laying out his own version of a peace program. Negotiations regarding 
UNSC Resolution 598 continued into 1989, though the July 1988 acceptance of the resolution ended 
the war. 171 
 
Consequences of the war 
 The raw toll of the Iran-Iraq War on human life was drastic. Over the eight years of the war, 
military causalities alone were upwards of 380,000 people, of which 125,000 were deaths. Iraqi POWs 
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were estimated to be around 50,000. All causalities, including civilian, adding to over 500,000 people, 
which is a little less than three percent of Iraq’s entire population.172 After all of the death and 
destruction, the only success Iraq could perhaps reasonably claim was in staving the Iranian threat of 
hegemony. Much of Iraq’s infrastructure was damaged; the damage was particularly devastating in 
Basrah and in the surrounding regions, which were virtually destroyed.173 Apart from the human toll 
suffered by all, the middle class was severely weakened and bore the brunt of the economic damage 
sustained during the war. As the middle class suffered, a small, but growing, wealthy class of 
merchants, contractors, businessmen, and other profiteers emerged.174 Iraq was in a state of decay; its 
resources had begun to wear thin from the first day of the war. 
 
THE WAR WITH KUWAIT 
Iraq’s invasion 
The economic crisis in Iraq following the war with Iran was so great that Saddam could not 
afford to ignore it. Rather, he pushed the issue to the forefront of his rhetoric, focusing specifically on 
Kuwait’s role in the crisis.175 He bolstered his actions with talk of a “Kuwaiti conspiracy.” During the 
Iran-Iraq War, Iraq had borrowed money from Saudi Arabia and from Kuwait. While Saudi Arabia 
agreed to forgive Iraq’s debt, Kuwait did not. In response, Saddam propagated a full-blown conspiracy 
that Kuwait was responsible for Iraq’s severe economic crisis post-war and that in fact, the crisis was of 
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Kuwaiti-design.176 On 17 July 1990, on the twenty-second anniversary of the coup d’état that brought 
members of the Ba’th Party to power, Saddam claimed that “[The Kuwaiti conspiracy] is a conspiracy 
to make us live in famine.”177 Saddam also pushed a territorial agenda: Iraq had little geographical 
potential for ports; as a major exporter of oil in the global trade market, access to, and control of major 
waterways and ports of entry was a must for the economy, but Iraq had limited access to the coastline. 
With the Shatt al-Arab closed following the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam turned to Umm Qasr, a port on 
the border with Kuwait and on the Persian Gulf coast. While Iraq is a significantly larger country than 
Kuwait, it only has thirty-six miles of coastline, while Kuwait has 310. Saddam also looked to assert 
control over the islands of Warbah and Bubiyan, and the channel of Khawr ‘Abd Allah, which were 
off the coast near Umm Qasr and under Kuwaiti sovereignty. Saddam claimed that the decision to 
invade was to “rectify” the borders set by the British imperial powers, which unjustly separated Kuwait 
from Iraq.178 
 Saddam was feeling the pressure of the international community amid the internal decline of 
the Iraqi state. By 1990, the Soviet Union, one of Iraq’s allies in the Iran-Iraq War, was in a state of 
collapse. Following a September 1988 announcement from the U.S. Department of State that it had 
found evidence of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, the Western powers became acutely critical of 
Saddam’s regime.179 This criticism became even more focused when, in February of 1990, Iraq 
activated its first uranium enrichment plant at Tarmiyyah, about thirty-five miles north of Baghdad. 
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The U.S. and its allies, including Israel, immediately condemned the move and called for an end to 
Iraq’s nascent weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) program. Saddam was afraid that this 
condemnation would bring on the military ire of the Israeli armed forces, and that another strike was 
imminent.180 
The order to invade Kuwait in 1990 likely only came from Saddam and a few close confidants. 
Much of the international community was shocked when Iraqi armed forces crossed the Kuwaiti 
border in the early days of August of 1990, having falsely believed that Saddam’s threats to invade were 
bluffs to coerce Kuwait into an agreement. The road to the invasion formally began on 15 July 1990, 
when Iraq presented its case against Kuwait at the Arab League, to no avail. The next day, Saddam 
mobilized the Republican Guard. By the end of July, Iraq’s armed forces were prepared for a full 
military invasion and had built up the capacity to occupy Kuwait. Several leaders in the Arab world 
were quick to try to dissuade Saddam from invading, including King Hussein of Jordan and Yasser 
Arafat, the chairman of the Palestinian Authority. On 24 July, Hosni Mubarak, the president of 
Egypt, went to Baghdad to speak with Saddam in person in an attempt to mediate the situation. Then, 
the next day, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, spoke to Saddam regarding the Kuwait 
situation and having determined that the situation had been diffused, left Baghdad a few days later. 
Saudi Arabia intervened next, organizing a negotiation between Iraqi and Kuwaiti delegates at Jeddah 
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on 31 July.181 The Kuwaitis left Jeddah under the impression that there would be another round of 
negotiations in the near future.182 
All of these efforts were unsuccessful and at 2 a.m. on the morning of 2 August 1990, 100,000 
Iraqi troops crossed the border and entered Kuwaiti territory.183 At 9:30 a.m., Baghdadi radio 
announced a coup d’état in Kuwait, and that Iraq was establishing a provisional government. The next 
day, the UNSC adopted Resolution 660, which condemned Iraq’s invasion into Kuwait and called for 
an immediate withdrawal. When Iraq failed to withdraw, the UNSC adopted Resolution 661, which 
put trade embargoes on all imports and exports, with the exception of basic goods for survival. On 7 
August, Iraq declared Kuwait a republic and the U.S. dispatched military personnel to the Gulf. Iraq 
was still not deterred and the next day, annexed Kuwait. On 28 August, Iraq declared Kuwait the 
nineteenth wilayah of Iraq.184 
 
The stalemate and the Gulf War 
The stalemate in Kuwait lasted from September of 1990 until January of 1991, when U.S.-led 
forces invaded Kuwait. The U.S. and its allies, primarily the United Kingdom, prepared for war 
following the U.N.’s adoption of Resolution 678, which declared that Iraq’s deadline for withdrawal 
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from Kuwait was on 15 January 1991. As the day inched closer, Saddam held to his belief that he could 
push the international community to the edge with his brinkmanship and force concessions.185 He 
believed if the Coalition forces invaded, he could still manage a “survivable withdrawal.”186 However, 
he was still taken by surprise when the Coalition assault began by air on 17 January at 2:30 a.m., 
commencing the Gulf War. The bombing campaign in Iraq killed 2,280 people and injured about 
8,000. The next day, Iraq launched missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia, both U.S. allies, and launched a 
second attack on Saudi Arabia on 29 January.187 
With a Coalition invasion of Kuwait imminent, on 22 February, Saddam ordered Iraqi forces 
to set all of Kuwait’s oil fields on fire, destroying much of their oil reserves and creating an 
environmental crisis. The ground offensive, both U.S. Marines and Saudi troops, began two days later 
and by 25 February, Saddam ordered a withdrawal. The Coalition forces, however, stated that they 
would reject the withdrawal until Iraq accepted all of the UNSC resolutions. At that point, the 
potential for total devastation of Iraqi forces had become clear and to accept the UNSC resolutions 
became Saddam’s only option; on 27 February, he announced Iraq’s acceptance and began the 
retreat.188 By the next day, the Gulf War was over.189 At the end of the Gulf War, the estimated number 
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of deaths was anywhere between 10,000 and 30,000 people. The number of Iraqi POWs and defectors 
was as high as 90,000. Amid the chaos of the retreat, the Republican Guard, Saddam’s loyalist security 




A Kuwaiti oil field that was set on fire following Saddam’s orders, captured by photojournalist and documentarian, 
Sebastião Salgado.191 
The Shi‘i uprisings, March 1991 
 The retreating soldiers were demoralized and disgruntled at the regime. The Coalition 
bombing campaign in Iraq had further destroyed much of its infrastructure, which had already been 
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weakened by the Iran-Iraq War. The soldiers were aware that they were leaving the failure in Kuwait to 
return home to war-battered Iraq. The Shi‘i uprisings began among the ranks of retreating soldiers in 
Basrah on 1 March 1991. The revolt was sparked by an angry solider who abruptly stopped his tank, 
and, using the tank’s gun, shot a bullet through a portrait of Saddam in Sa’d Square.192 Almost 
immediately, the armed forces fell into disarray and revolting soldiers turned on key buildings of the 
regime in the city, attacking and occupying them. Within a week, the revolt had spread throughout the 
southern region. At its peak, rebel forces controlled fourteen of Iraq’s eighteen wilayat. Most of the 
rebel forces sought to destroy any and all symbols of the regime, and to attack the loyalist armed forces, 
mainly the Republican Guard. The head of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq 
(SCIRI), Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, sent some of his Badr Brigade troops from Iran to aid Shi‘i 
Arabs in the fight.193 The four wilayat that largely abstained from the revolt—all of which were 
predominately Sunni Arab—with most of its population choosing to stay loyal to Saddam, were called 
the “white provinces” by the regime. Though the revolt spread quickly to other areas in Iraq, by 17 
March, the Republican Guard had regrouped and ended the uprising.194 
The repression of the uprising began eleven days earlier in Basrah, on 6 March 1991. The 
repression was absolutely brutal. The regime destroyed many sacred religious sites, primarily in the 
Shi‘i shrine cities, in retaliation. In fact, the shrine cities were the center of some of the harshest 
repression by Saddam’s security forces.195 The regime’s forces killed upwards of 100,000 in the course 
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of the revolts alone, which was nearly twice as many as those killed during the war in Kuwait. The 
repression also created a refugee population of about two million people who flooded into Iran and 
Saudi Arabia.196 The UNSC adopted Resolution 688 on 5 April 1991, which condemned the 
repression of Shi‘i Arabs and called for an end to the repression of all Iraqi civilians.197 By the next 
month, though, Saddam pardoned Iraqis who had participated in the revolt and lifted an international 
travel ban on them. This was all part of a larger regime reorganization effort in which elections were 
held and a new cabinet was formed under the auspices of Sa’dun Hammadi, a Shi‘i Arab. This 
reorganization, however, was a guise for the harsher tactic of arrests and executions within the Party.198 
These tactics—“the carrot and the stick”—will be discussed in further depth in the section on 
Saddam’s pillars of power. 
 
IRAQ BETWEEN THE WARS 
Political and economic consequences of Iran and Kuwait 
When the war in Kuwait began in 1990, just two years had passed since the end of the Iran-
Iraq War. The memory of the atrocities of the war with Iran—the use of chemical weapons, the 
scorched earth strategies, the Anfal Campaign, to name a few—were still fresh in the minds of the 
international community. The invasion brought further condemnation and scrutiny to Saddam’s 
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regime in Iraq.199 In the brief interwar years, Iraq was at the mercy of the sanctions and UNSC 
resolutions, which crippled the economy, depleted the middle class, and caused agitation among the 
people. The two wars had brought so much death that by 1997, fifty-six percent of the population was 
under the age of nineteen.200 The decisions made largely by one man brought an era of chaos and 
despair onto an entire country. 
In the north of Iraq, in the disputed Kurdish territories, intra-regional conflict broke out into a 
full-scale civil war in 1995. On 4 July 1992, a coalition of Kurdish political groups established the 
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). But the two most powerful groups, the KDP and the PUK, 
remained notably absent from the coalition. Soon after the formation of the KRG, tensions rose 
between the two groups for territorial acquisitions, access to international aid, and control over key oil 
deposits. The first clashes between them began in December of 1993.201 The disputes between the 
KDP, led by Mas‘ud Barzani, and the PUK, led by Jalal Talabani, had severely weakened the strength 
of the KRG by May of 1994. A third party, the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK) seized 
the towns of Halabjah, Panjvin, and Khurmal, and the surrounding areas.202 In December, the PUK 
took control of Erbil.203 By the March of 1995, the KDP controlled about a third of the KRG, 
including the Turkish border, and the PUK controlled the remaining two thirds, including Erbil and 
Sulaimaniyyah. Soon after, the KRG collapsed and the PUK and KDP entered into a civil war for 
control over Iraqi Kurdistan. The collapse of the KRG and the civil war opened the way for a new 
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political group, the Kurdistan Workers Party (known more commonly as the PKK, the Partiya Karkari 
Kurdistan), a radical Kurdish movement from Turkey, to enter to Iraq and occupy strategic positions 
along the Turkish border.204 
 
Shi‘i opposition in the south 
The center of Shi‘i opposition to the regime was in the southern marsh region of Iraq, the same 
region that was at the center of the Shi‘i uprisings in March of 1991. Following the Gulf War and the 
Shi‘i uprisings, opposition in the south grew increasingly organized as more Shi‘i Arabs joined its 
ranks.205 In response, the regime led a massive effort, the so-called “third river project,” to drain the 
marshes by diverting the water away from the region.206 By 1994, the marshes were almost completely 
destroyed in the second regime-led environmental disaster in five years. During this time, a Shi‘i cleric 
by the name of Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr was growing his anti-regime movement.207 His rhetoric 
primarily appealed to the poor urban Shi‘i Arabs in Saddam City—a predominantly Shi‘i Arab suburb 
of Baghdad—and in Basrah, and among the poor tribes and marsh dwellers in and around ‘Amarrah 
and Nasiriyyah.208 
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Muhammad Sadiq propagated an interpretation of Islam that was steeped in mysticism and 
Messianism, specifically in the belief of the Mahdi. He led his movement from his mosque in Kufa, 
which is a small town near Najaf, south of Baghdad. At his mosque, he delivered sermons that directly 
challenged the regime. When he was assassinated by regime forces in 1999, Muhammad Sadiq’s son, 
Muqtada, took over the movement. While Muhammad Sadiq had laid the groundwork for the 
Sadrists, it was not until Muqtada took control that the movement evolved into a power, influential, 
and violent insurgent organization.209 
 
SADDAM’S PILLARS OF POWER 
In the twenty-four years of Saddam’s regime, Saddam managed to maintain his power by 
institutions based on systems of loyalty, propaganda, and intimidation. He did so through a range of 
ideological and material means. Saddam undergirded his ideological regime with the apparatus of his 
material power. His demands for loyalty, for example, would not have been possible without the 
structure of the Ba’th Party, and vice-versa. This section will focus on the main ideological pillars of 
Saddam’s regime, and discuss the material powers where appropriate. 
 
Loyalty 
Saddam Hussein was born to a poor Sunni Arab family in the small town of Tikrit. While he 
was Sunni, the same denomination as many of the top-ranking officials in the Iraqi government, he 
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was from a lower social class, and therefore, would likely have been unable to climb the sociopolitical 
ladder if the existing hierarchies had remained. Because of this and the fact that Saddam could not rely 
on the extant social structures as a source of power, he created a system of patronage based on loyalty 
to his person. For anyone to gain proximity to Saddam and, therefore, any semblance of power within 
the Ba’th Party, Saddam demanded absolute loyalty. To put it in the words of Tripp, underneath the 
surface of the official state structure, there was a “shadow state” composed of networks of patronage, 
loyalty, privilege, and exclusion.210 
When he ascended to the presidency in 1979, his power was already concentrated in the Ba’th 
Party itself. However, knowing full well that there were many Party members who suspected that he 
had been plotting to oust Hassan al-Bakr for some time, he carried out yet another purge of the Party. 
This event, discussed earlier in this chapter, occurred when just days after he assumed the presidency, 
Saddam announced that he had discovered traitors within the Party and had nearly seventy people 
arrested on the spot. Although Saddam, alongside other top members of the Ba’th Party, led other 
purges in the years leading up to his presidency, this differed in that it was of members of the Ba’th 
Party itself; past purges were of external political parties and opponents. With this move, Saddam 
established that he would tolerate only absolute loyalty and obedience to his rule.211 The Ba’th Party 
also became open to general membership, which communicated a sense of obligation to one leader—
Saddam—rather than some nebulous group.212 Saddam’s personal power grew exponentially in the 
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first years of his regime. In order to ensure loyalty within the ranks of the Ba’th Party, Saddam created 
a system of patronage in which membership in the Ba’th Party was essential to success in Iraqi society; 
it was next to impossible for any individual to reach high levels of success without also being a member 
of the Ba’th Party. However, the closer an individual grew to Saddam, the greater the risks.213 For these 
reasons, many historians have compared this pillar of Saddam’s regime to the tactics that Josef Stalin 
employed in the U.S.S.R.214 
In addition to the Ba’th Party, the military was an essential material tool for intimidation and 
control. The military, just like the Ba’th Party, had to be controlled from within to avoid internal 
insurrections against Saddam’s rule, which was especially pertinent considering the armed forces’ 
historical role in Iraqi politics. One of the first major tests to the military’s loyalty came in the early 
years of the war with Iran. The 1982 retreat after Ayatollah Khomeini’s refusal to accept Saddam’s 
withdrawal caused soldiers to become disillusioned with Saddam and question his military strategies. 
As families were losing their sons, brothers, and fathers at unprecedented numbers, many Iraqis 
understood the war as a personal conflict between Saddam and Khomeini. Saddam, aware of this, 
tightened his grip on the military through the security apparatus that was operated by his closest 
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confidants and eventually even his own son. Even with this tightened control, some soldiers still 
attempted to start a coup, though none were successful. 
The power of the Republican Guard, which in reality, was Saddam’s personal militia, grew 
tremendously over the years. It is likely that if the Republican Guard had not survived the Coalition 
assaults during the Gulf War and during the subsequent retreat, Saddam’s regime would not have 
survived until 2003. However, in the years following the crisis in the Kuwait and the Gulf War, the 
power of the military was severely weakened. By 2003, the military’s capacities were severely reduced. 
Its main purpose became—and really the extent of its abilities—was to protect Saddam, the 
Republican Palace, and other regime strongholds.215 The two wars had not only weakened the armed 
forces in manpower, but also in fiscal and material resources. 
 
Kinship 
In a country where familial ties and tribal relations were a foundational aspect of its social 
relations, it is perhaps not surprising that kinship was a key mean of power in the Saddam regime. 
What is surprising is that Saddam’s tribe, the Albu Nasser of Tikrit, was at the center of it all. Many of 
the people in top-ranking positions in the Ba’th Party were from Tikrit, a small town on the Tigris 
River, about forty miles northwest of Samarra and a little over one hundred miles from Baghdad. If it 
were not for the fact that this was the home town of Saddam Hussein and many powerful Ba’thists, it 
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would be a rather unremarkable place.216 By 1998, twenty-five percent of the RCC and the Regional 
Command were from Tikrit alone. Sixty-one percent were from the Sunni Arab triangle in the 
northwest region of Baghdad. These numbers reflect that control was largely clan-based, 
overwhelmingly Sunni, and concentrated in Tikrit. 
As time went on, not only was power and control increasingly concentrated among Tikritis, 
but also in Saddam’s own tribe, the Albu Nasser. By 2003, Saddam’s tribal group occupied most key 
positions within the Party, the security apparatus, and in the military.217 In the interwar years, Saddam 
continued to narrow his power base, his Ahl al-Thiqa, into an exceedingly small number of 
individuals.218 His power base became so concatenated that the bulk of the power was in the hands of 
members of his own family. In 1993, Saddam appointed his son, Qusay, as head of the Special Security 
Organization (SSO). In December of 1996, Saddam’s eldest son, Uday, was attacked by a Shi‘i militia 
in Baghdad and subsequently forced to pass off some of his control to Qusay. There was a second 
attempt on one of Saddam’s sons, this time Qusay, the next year.219 
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The increasingly small group of those in power is evident in the tensions within Saddam’s 
family.220 The struggle for power within Saddam’s family is most apparent in the incident between 
Saddam and his brother-in law, Hussein Kamel of the al-Majid clan. Hussein Kamel, who was a key 
player in the development of Iraq’s WMD program, reportedly revealed crucial details of the WMD 
program to people he should not have. He was then demoted from his top position in Iraq’s oil-
smuggling business and his control was transferred to Uday. Hussein Kamel’s father, ‘Ali Hasan, was 
also dismissed from his role as minister of defense. In August of 1995, Hussein Kamel, his brother, 
Saddam Kamel, and their wives, both of whom were Saddam’s daughters, defected to Jordan, abruptly 
fleeing from Baghdad to Amman.221 The brothers and their wives were allowed to return in 1996, 
when Saddam issued the brothers a pardon on the condition that they divorce their wives. Saddam 
then sent his security forces to kill them. To show that this was a matter of family, and not one of the 
state, Saddam sent members of the Kamels’ own tribe to assassinate them.222 One explanation for why 
Saddam created this system of patronage and kinship, besides it being a useful tool for control, is that 
Saddam, born into low social status, needed his own kinship network that existed outside of the 
traditional social hierarchies of Iraq. Within the historical social schema of Iraq, Saddam’s background 
as a poor Tikriti would have been an obstacle to his rise to power. But, by creating his own social 
hierarchy in which his home town and tribe were at the top, Saddam could control patronage 
networks and access to power.223 
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Shi‘i Arabs and “the carrot and the stick” 
Saddam approached the Shi‘i community with a dizzying mix of inclusion and harsh 
punishment. Within the government, he made moves to include Shi‘i Arabs (and Iraqi Kurds) at 
higher levels. However, these moves were largely nominal in nature and in reality, Saddam created a 
system of institutional discrimination and exclusion. He made a point to include a diverse mix of 
representatives at the top levels of governance, but these were all purely symbolic and ultimately 
powerless positions.224 In the years following the wars with Iran and Kuwait, Saddam boasted a so-
called diversity in the government that served as a guise for the systematic exclusion of Shi‘i Arabs from 
key decision-making positions and opportunities for political power. In addition to positions in the 
government, Saddam took many public actions to create a sense that he supported the Shi‘i Arabs of 
Iraq. For example, he approved several public funding projects in the south and made the birthday of 
‘Ali, the central religious figure in Shi‘ism, a national holiday. But, much like the moves he made 
within the government, these were surface-level actions made amid real persecution. By the end of the 
Iran-Iraq War, Saddam’s regime had deported about 200,000 Shi‘i Arabs for reasons ranging from 
supposed corroboration with the Iranian government to lying to the government about one’s true 
identity as an Iranian. In the end, this move had the intended effect of dividing the opposition. 
Through the carrot and the stick, Saddam was able to ensure that the opposition was never able to gain 
enough traction to pose a significant threat to his regime.225 
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Cult of personality 
 The cult of personality that surrounded Saddam was imperative not only as another tool to 
instill loyalty and admiration of him, but also to create an aura of singularity that made him distinct, 
placing him above all other Iraqis, but especially above all other Tikritis.226 This cult of personality 
exploded during the Iran-Iraq War. This was largely Saddam’s doing, rather than an organic 
development from among the people. The full-blown cult of personality began in the early days of the 
war with Iran, when Saddam led a propaganda campaign to describe the Iran-Iraq War in language 
steeped in myth. The propaganda was carefully designed to give Saddam legitimacy by way of 
founding myths and stories of great historical triumphs.227  Saddam referred to the war as “Qadisiyyat 
Saddam,” in reference to the seventh century battle between the Arab Islamic army and the 
Zoroastrian Sassanid Persian Empire. 
The state-sponsored media described the Iran-Iraq War as the “second Qadissiyah,” that would 
be won by “the knights of the Arabs and their commander, Saddam Hussein.” This had the effect of 
promoting the idea that it was Iraqi Arabs’ moral duty to rise up as a common nation to fight against 
the “Zoroastrian,” non-Muslim, non-Arab enemy in Iran.228 By supporting the idea that the true 
protectors of Islam could only be Arabs, Saddam was attempting to divide the Iraqi Shi‘i Arabs from 
the Iranian Shi‘i Persians.229 Though the war ended in a stalemate, Saddam led a propaganda campaign 
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of victory in which he continued the rhetoric of the war as a jihad against the threat from Iran. Saddam 
promoted his cult of personality within this framework and through the use of print media and 
symbolic imagery. In murals across the country, for example, Saddam was depicted alongside Sa’d ibn 
Abi Waqqas, a companion to the Prophet Muhammad and the commander in the first Battle of 
Qadissiyah and with the famous Qadissiyah general, al-Qa’qa ibn ‘Amr ibn Malik Tamimi. On the 
twenty-five-dinar note from 1986 Saddam was depicted in his field marshal’s uniform against the 





The twenty-five dinar note from 1986, depicting Saddam Hussein as the commander at Qadissiyah230 
Alongside the development of this propaganda, Saddam began to purport himself as the 
symbol for the people and of the people. For instance, he named his birthday, 28 April, a national 
holiday.231 But he primarily did this by constructing a familial linage between him and the Prophet 
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Muhammad and to historical figures that were well-known in Iraqi lore. He described himself as the 
“modern-day Nebuchadnezzar,” likening himself to the ancient Babylonian king. He also created a 
lineage that linked himself to the Abbasid Caliphate, of which the Iraqi cities of Kufa, Baghdad, 
Raqqah, and Samarra all served as capitals in the eighth and ninth centuries.232 This rhetoric was 
largely successful among the youth of the country because, as mentioned earlier, by 1997, fifty-six 
percent of Iraq’s population was under the age of nineteen; over half of the population’s entire lives 
had been under Saddam’s regime. The mobilization of the youth from the late 1990s to the early 2000s 
occurred alongside the rise of fundamentalism and a stricter adherence to religious views in Iraq. 
 
Religion 
Following the Gulf War, the regime encouraged a turn to religion among the youth as part of 
Saddam’s “faith campaign.” This was a tool that Saddam used as he moved the country away from 
Arab nationalism—since the regime was at odds with much of the Arab world—and towards Iraqi 
nationalism. Saddam described himself as a “redeemer,” and encouraged a deeper sense of tribalism.233 
In January of 1991, he added “God is great” to the Iraqi flag.234 Saddam used the rhetoric of jihad to 
describe the fight against foreign entities, which was especially acute in the time leading up to the 2003 
invasion. In the years between the Gulf War and the Iraq War, Saddam shifted from the rhetoric of the 
Iran-Iraq War years, which was largely steeped in historical propaganda and Iraqi founding myths, to 
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religious rhetoric based in Islamism. This is likely because of the continued threats from Khomeini in 
Iran and the influence he held over many Shi‘i Arabs in Iraq, especially after the repression of the 
uprisings in 1991. He created a lineage that connected him directly with the Prophet Muhammad’s 
son-in-law, ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib, and then to the Abbasid caliph of Baghdad, al-Mansur. Saddam’s so-
called “faith campaign” attracted much of the country’s youth and served as a bulwark to his cult of 
personality.235 
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Iraq, the Occupied State; Iraq, the Failed State: 





After the fall of the regime in April 2003, just three weeks after the invasion by U.S.-led 
coalition forces, signs of a failed state had already emerged. The state was in transition from the 
autocratic and authoritarian regime of Saddam Hussein by way of a provisional government under 
U.S. auspices, to presumably, a sovereign Iraqi state. However, the coalition powers that created and 
implemented the new state structure were ill-prepared for the actual work of state-building. Though 
this paper is not primarily on the U.S.’s impetus and reasoning specifically, this section will touch 
upon pertinent factors that contributed to the tumultuous period that was the Iraq War and the 
sectarian civil war in Baghdad. 
 
THE OCCUPATION OF IRAQ 
The U.S.’s objectives 
In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in 2001, President George W. Bush and his 
administration refocused their attention on the supposed “war on terror” that it was fighting in the 
Middle East and Central Asia. U.S. conservatives in Congress pushed for a regime change in Iraq based 
on scant evidence of the existence of a weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMDs) program and Saddam’s 
links to Osama bin Laden, the head of the terrorist organization al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan and the 
orchestrator of the 9/11 attacks. Though there was no evidence, the U.S. claimed that Iraq still 
possessed WMDs, which meant that Iraq was in direct violation of UNSC Resolution 687. The Bush 
administration reacted by developing a military offensive strategy, called Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
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The objectives of Operation Iraqi Freedom were first, and foremost, to capture Baghdad, defeat 
Saddam’s forces (especially the Republican Guard, Saddam’s loyalist forces that were protecting 
Baghdad), and the fall of the regime. The coalition forces had expected it would appoint the key 
opposition leaders that were living in exile to replace Saddam and the Ba’th Party. These key 
opposition groups were the same groups that were designated to receive U.S. support under the U.S.-
Iraq Liberation Act of 1998.236 
 
The invasion 
On 12 September 2002, President George W. Bush urged the U.N. General Assembly to take 
immediate action in Iraq that focused on Iraq’s WMD program. By November of the same year, some 
of Bush’s demands had been met when the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1441, which 
stated that Iraq must immediately restore the WMD inspections. Though Iraq accepted the 
resolutions and inspections began, the U.S. and the U.K. began to deploy troops to its military bases in 
the Gulf in preparation for a possible invasion.  The Bush Administration believed that UNSC 
Resolution 1441 was too little, too late. On 18 March 2003, Bush gave Saddam forty-eight hours to 
leave the country. In the early hours of 20 March, coalition forces began their “shock and awe” air 
campaign that targeted regime strongholds, command and control facilities, and Iraq’s military 
capacities, but avoided oil installations and electricity grids. By mid-morning, ground forces had 
crossed into Iraqi territory from Kuwait. Combined U.S. and U.K. forces immediately secured the 
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major oil fields in the south of the country. Then U.K. forces went on to secure Basrah and other key 
areas in the south. The bulk of the Coalition forces went north along the Euphrates River, towards 
Nasiriyah, Samawah, and Najaf, but did not anticipate the fight that Saddam’s Fedayeen guerilla forces 
put up in Nasiriyah and Samawah.237 The Coalition’s military plan was to put the majority of Iraq’s 
eighteen wilayat under U.S. control, while the four southernmost wilayat, including Basrah, would be 
controlled by the British, the four wilayat north of Basrah would be under the control of ten of the 
other Coalition forces, led by Polish forces, and the three Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) 
provinces would mostly be left to peshmerga control.238 
On 4 April, the first U.S. forces reached Baghdad’s airport. By the next day, they had defeated 
irregular forces, took over the Republican Palace, and set up headquarters there.239 In the north of the 
country, the fighting was going a little differently: Turkey, which opposed the invasion, refused to 
allow coalition forces to enter Iraq from Turkish territory. Instead of a ground assault, the U.S. was 
forced to rely on air attacks, special forces, and in particular, the Kurdish peshmerga. The first region 
that coalition forces attacked in the north was the Panjvin district in the Sulaymaniyah region, on the 
Iranian border. The district was under the control of Ansar al-Islam, a radical Sunni group with a 
history of hostility toward the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). By the end of March, the PUK 
had taken over the area with help from the Coalition forces. The members of Ansar al-Islam fled the 
country but became critical figures when they returned to Iraq some time later to help found al-Qa’ida 
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in Iraq (AQI). In Iraqi Kurdistan, the peshmerga took over many Kurdish-majority regions in addition 




The well-documented moment when U.S. soldiers helped Iraqis pull down the statue of Saddam in Firdous Square, 
Baghdad, on 9 April 2003, captured by photojournalist James Nachtwey.240 
By mid-April, coalition forces had managed to gain control over Basrah, Nasiriyah, Samawah, 
Najaf, Karbala, and Kut, though their control was weak. As forces continued to move throughout the 
country, their primary challenges were in the northern towns along the Tigris in the Sunni Arab 
triangle where they were unable to gain control; these towns, including Tikrit and Anbar, were 
Saddam’s former strongholds.241 On 22 July 2003, Coalition forces found Uday and Qusay in a safe 
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house in Mosul; both were killed in the subsequent shootout. On 13 December 2003, Coalition forces 
captured Saddam Hussein in Tikrit.242 
 
The immediate aftermath 
Most of the planning by the U.S. and its allies focused on the invasion and military strategies, 
but little time was spent on creating a cohesive plan for Iraq post-invasion. The Pentagon was in 
control of most of the planning, and other departments had little say in the initial decisions.243 In the 
wake of the Coalition invasion, the country devolved into chaos. Looting became widespread, both in 
Baghdad and in the peshmerga-controlled areas in the north, where it went unchecked by the Coalition 
forces whose main concern was with protecting oil installations, not civilians or infrastructure. The 
looting virtually destroyed the country’s infrastructure, not to mention the destruction of cultural 
sites, such as the Baghdad National Museum, which housed priceless cultural artifacts. Yaphe argues 
that although much of the looting and the violence that erupted in the weeks after the invasion were 
perpetrated by individuals and small, non-insurgent groups, these events were the first signs of a 
nascent insurgent movement. The categorization of these incidents as “looting and random acts of 
violence” instead of a growing, organized insurgent movement was perhaps one of the first critical 
mistakes by the coalition forces.244 
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The deputy director of the Baghdad National Museum, Muhsin Hasan, sitting among the rubble of the looting of the 
Museum on 13 April 2003, in this widely-published photograph captured by Mario Tama.245 
The fall of the regime created a power vacuum that, along with the lack of oversight by 
Coalition forces, led to the creation of shadow governments in major cities across the country. The 
most important shadow governments were in Basrah, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution 
in Iraq (SCIRI) led by Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, along with its armed wing, the Badr 
Brigade; in Nasiriyah, tribes associated with al-Da’wa; in Karbala, the Islamic Action Organization, 
and in Baghdad and the southern marsh regions, the Sadrists.246 On the other hand, a number of allies 
to the Coalition emerged. These groups were at first exclusively Shi‘i groups who were willing to work 
within the formal political process in the hope that it would lead to a Shi‘i majority. These groups were 
primarily the Iraqi National Congress (INC) and its divisive leader Ahmed Chalabi, and the Iraqi 
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National Alliance (INA), led by Ayad Allawi. Not only were these groups working with Coalition 
forces to work towards sovereignty, but, moreover, because they had no military force to back them 
and were forced to rely on foreign support to gain power.247 
 
The United States’ attempt at nation-building 
Operation Iraqi Freedom was likely doomed from the start. According to A. Heather Coyne, 
who participated in the reconstruction operation in Iraq as an Army Affairs Officer, then as the chief 
of party for the U.S. Institute of Peace, writes that at the core of Operation Iraqi Freedom’s problems 
was its fundamental inability to implement any of its programs.248 The core group of commanders in 
charge of the nation-building mission in Iraq were ill-prepared and unqualified to carry out a task as 
difficult, nuanced, and multidimensional as nation-building. Following the slow pace of the 
community development programs, the U.S. created the Commander’s Emergency Response Program 
(CERP), which provided as a pool of money for the commanding officers to use towards sustainable 
development programs. The problem, however, was that most of the commanders were inexperienced 
in such programs and in budgeting and contracting and failed to coordinate with other Coalition 
programs. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programs faced similar 
problems.249 In short, Coalition forces defeated the Saddam regime and dissolved its bureaucratic 
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structures and other key state apparatuses, but failed to immediately implement a sustainable, well-
functioning replacement, even if a temporary one. 
The other main flaw of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the general approach by the Coalition 
forces was the fundamental misunderstanding of—or lack of effort made to understand—the crucial 
cultural and historical factors that contributed to Iraq at that point in time. Not only did the Coalition 
forces assume that they would be welcomed by the people of Iraq as liberators of the regime, but they 
also believed that the work of nation-building would be a short and mostly seamless process of 
transferring power from Saddam’s Ba’th Party to the opposition leaders who had been in exile.250 
Further, the Coalition forces failed to recognize how their incursion might be seen as an occupation by 
a foreign aggressor, reminiscent of Britain’s first military incursion into the Mesopotamia Province in 
1914. In both instances, in 2003 and 1914, foreign powers entered Iraq, established a nation-building 
program, and appointed outsiders to positions of power, excluding particular segments of the 
population, namely the Shi‘is and the Sunnis, respectively.251 
 
The Coalition Provisional Authority 
The first and short-lived attempt at nation-building by the U.S. was in the form of the Office 
of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), directed by the retired general Jay Garner, 
who had experience in Iraq post-Gulf War, mostly in Iraqi Kurdistan.252 The foundational assumption 
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of the ORHA was that Coalition forces would withdraw by September. Its original plan was also to 
appoint key leadership positions Iraqis who had recently returned from exile, not Iraqis who had lived 
in Iraq during the Saddam years.253 The plan also included basics such as humanitarian aid and 
establishing law and order under ORHA auspices. But, significant problems, such as the destruction 
to infrastructure, looting, and the general chaos of the country after the invasion, severely limited 
Garner’s ability to implement this plan.254 The plan never came to fruition—at least not under the 
ORHA; Garner’s term in Baghdad only lasted from 21 April to 22 May 2003, when he was replaced 
by ambassador L. Paul Bremer III.255 
On 6 May 2003, President Bush replaced Garner with Bremer and announced that the U.S. 
would seek a U.N. resolution to give the U.S. the status and privileges of an occupying power. Bremer 
arrived in Baghdad on 11 May and stayed in Iraq until 28 June 2004. Bremer’s first organizational 
action as director of the nation-building effort was to meet with key opposition leaders on 16 May to 
inform them that the U.S. had successfully obtained status as an occupying power as per UNSC 
Resolution 1483 and was now officially named the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Under the 
resolution, the U.N. gave the CPA legal authority and the ability to spend Iraq’s funds. Bremer’s 
second major organizational action was in mid-July when he reorganized Coalition forces into the 
Combined Joint Task Force-7, headed by Lt. General Ricardo Sanchez.256 
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In the first weeks of the CPA, it became clear that the heads of the U.S. nation-building 
operation did not have a clear plan for Iraq post-invasion and lacked an understanding of deeply-
rooted sociopolitical structures. This is most evident in the first two CPA orders, which ordered the 
de-Ba’thification of Iraq and the dissolution of Iraq’s military. The same day that Bremer met with 
leaders to inform them of the CPA’s establishment, he adopted CPA Order One, which called for the 
disestablishment of the Ba’th Party and the elimination of all of its extant structures to ensure that it 
could never reestablish itself.257 CPA Order One also excluded the people making up the top four 
ranks of the Party—al-firqah, al-shu’bah, al-far’, and the Regional Command—from entering the 
public sector, which in total affected about 30,000 people.258 Though the two million-plus members 
of the Ba’th Party were certainty not exclusively Sunni, by 2003, the top four ranks of the Party were 
Sunni; the de-Ba’thification order was seen by many Ba’th Party members and Sunni Iraqis as more of 
a “de-Sunnification” than a de-Ba’thification order.259 
This move was popular with the opposition leaders, especially Chalabi and the INC, as well as 
other Shi‘i and Kurdish opposition groups.260 The impetus behind the de-Ba’thification order was 
that, when Saddam had taken over the party as president in 1979, he had ostensibly turned the Party 
“bad.” In other words, the Party before Saddam’s influence was more akin to the average political 
party in Iraq at the time, rather than the tool of a totalitarian dictator. By characterizing the Party as 
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such, Bremer and the CPA powers failed to recognize that Saddam was just as much a result of the 
Party as the Party was a result of Saddam.261 
The second CPA order was adopted on 23 May 2003 and called for the total dissolution of 
Iraq’s military and its intelligence and security divisions. According to Marr, CPA Order Two took 
most of the population by surprise and was not met as positively as Order One. The order also affected 
far more people than the first; with the dissolution of the military, about 400,000 Iraqis were out of a 
job.262 The second order affected the population at large in a much more significant way than the de-
Ba’thification order because of the pervasive attitudes toward the Iraqi armed forces. The Iraqi 
population was never formally informed of the armed forces’ role in the atrocities committed against 
the Kurds, the Assyrians, and other minority groups throughout Iraq in the years since its formation. 
The armed forces were still seen as the “preserver of the nation’s core values,” and were steeped in 
heroic myths. Since its formation in the first years of the British Mandate, the military took a central 
role in the politics of the state, as is evidenced by the string of coup d’états from the 1930s to the 1970s 
that were led by army officers. Then, under the Ba’th Party, the armed forces became a critical tool of 
the Party for the control of the nation and the military’s presence in daily, public life became 
commonplace. The Iran-Iraq War and the invasion of Kuwait were strongly associated with founding 
myths dating back to the time of the Prophet Muhammad.263 Though the order also called for the 
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creation of a new Iraqi corps for the purposes of self-defense, the plan was poorly implemented. In 
August, the recruitment for the new armed forces began, as did efforts to rebuild the police force. By 
the time the CPA was dissolved, the armed forces had grown to about 180,000 people. However, the 
recruitment of new officers was done extremely quickly, and the armed forces were rapidly filled with 
inexperienced Iraqis. The resulting military and police forces were unprofessional and chaotic.264 
With the dissolution of Iraq’s armed forces, policing at local levels largely fell to U.S. troops. 
The troops quickly became infamous for their brutal and humiliating tactics used against locals.265 The 
lack of expertise in the CPA was further exacerbated by the overreliance on U.S. troops, most of whom 
did not have the necessary skills (for example, fluency in Arabic or cultural training).266 With the 
heightened tensions and animosity towards U.S. troops, militias emerged and essentially became the 
only security forces available for the local population (or rather, for protection against the U.S. 
troops). The creation of militias intensified as foreign insurgents continued to enter the country and 
join these militias. In May of 2003, the CPA forbade the creation of militias, with the notable 
exception of the U.S.-allied peshmerga in the north. Despite the CPA order, militias continued to 
function under the radar. The SCIRI’s militia, in particular, was adept in moving around this order 
and gradually became a large contingent of the new national police and security forces.267 
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The Interim Governing Council 
 The CPA created the Interim Governing Council (IGC) to replace the Ba’th Party and to 
function as a stepping stone for Iraqi governance on the way to full sovereignty. The groups invited to 
participate in the formation of the IGC were the groups identified under the U.S.-Iraq Liberation Act 
of 1998, in addition to al-Da’wa, led by Ibrahim al-Ja’fari, and the National Democratic Party (NDP), 
which later became the Iraq Liberation Council (ILC). Bremer wanted to expand the group to include 
insiders, since the identified groups consisted of mostly exiled leaders who had returned to Iraq after 
the fall of the regime. In May and June of 2003, Bremer sent teams to the Iraqi wilayat to recruit local 
representatives for the IGC. The teams returned with twelve local representatives, who, although they 
were not well-known except maybe in their highly-localized communities, came to form the 
foundation for the IGC.268 The KDP and the PUK, however, refused to join the IGC and, instead, on 
12 June 2003, together formed a singular Kurdish government.269 Then on 1 July, Grand Ayatollah Ali 
al-Sistani, a powerful Shi‘i cleric based in Najaf, issued a fatwa that rejected the CPA’s proposal that 
the new Iraqi constitution would be written by the IGC, which was filled with unelected officials.270 
Sistani is something of an enigmatic figure in the history of Iraq, especially during the course 
of the war. He was born in Mashhad, Iran, and trained under several revered Islamic religious scholars. 
He eventually settled in Najaf, where one of his mentors, Grand Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i, 
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appointed him the imam of the famous Khadra Mosque.271 Sistani is known as a “quietist,” meaning 
that he likely believed in a separation of mosque and state, which would explain the mystery 
surrounding his political beliefs prior to the 2003 invasion. After the invasion, he took a more central 
role in the formation of a new Iraq to ensure that it emerged as an Islamic state.272 
On 13 July 2003, the IGC itself announced its creation, which was a strategic move by the 
CPA to give the appearance that the IGC was an Iraqi-led effort, and not an American one. However, 
most of the Arab world saw the IGC as just another tool of the American occupation. On 14 August, 
the UNSC recognized the IGC via Resolution 1500. The twenty-five members of the IGC were 
dominated by the Iraq Liberation Council (ILC). Of the twelve identifiable parties the council 
members belonged to, six were secular—eight if counting the KDP and the PUK—and four parties 
were considered religious or sectarian. The main tasks of the IGC were to advise the CPA, to function 
as the interim, nominal Iraqi government, and most importantly, to draft a new constitution.273 
 
The 15 November Agreement and the Transitional Administrative Law 
 UNSC Resolution 1511, adopted 16 October 2003, stated that by December of 2003, the U.S. 
must present a transition plan for the implementation of a new Iraqi government. On 15 November, 
the U.S. announced the plan for the transition, known as the 15 November Agreement. On 8 
December, Bremer presented a plan for a constitution, a referendum to approve the constitution, 
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Iraq’s first post-war democratic election, and finally, the official transfer of authority to the Iraqis. The 
plan also created the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) as the provisional constitution until the 
Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) could write a new one. The TAL was negotiated behind closed doors 
over the course of a month, from 8 February to 8 March 2004. On 8 March, the CPA officially 
announced the TAL and its main provisions.274 As Coyne writes, the TAL had several major flaws, 
mostly that first, the writers of the constitution were not a representative sampling of the population 
of Iraq; second, the timeline for the turnover of authority limited the ability for full transparency and 
public input, and that third the constitutional process itself did not include any effective means for 
public participation.275 
Sistani, who was a powerful and influential leader among Iraqi Shi‘is, opposed this plan 
primarily for its timeline.276 Sistani took issue with the fact that the first election would not be until 
January of 2005. Bremer, however, rejected any of Sistani’s demands because he thought that an early 
election would favor the religious/Islamist factions over the secularists. On 2 June 2004, the CPA 
appointed the new IIG and on 28 June, Bremer handed over authority. On 30 June, the UNSC 
recognized Iraq’s full sovereignty, effective immediately. Bremer was then replaced as U.S. 
Ambassador to Iraq by John Negroponte, who served until 2005.277 
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The Allawi government, June 2004–May 2005 
The first IIG government was led by Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, a secular Shi‘i Arab from 
the Iraqi National Accord (INA). The members of his cabinet were mostly secular, friendly to the 
U.S.,  and anti-Iranian. Though Bremer had turned authority over to the IIG, the Coalition armed 
forces, renamed the Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I), under the command of General George W. 
Casey, were still in charge of security in Iraq.278 UNSC Resolution 1546 allowed for the continued 
military presence of the Coalition.279 Allawi’s government oversaw the highly anticipated first 
democratic elections, which took place on 30 January 2005. The elections were for a 275-seat national 
assembly, provincial assemblies, and a 111-seat Kurdish regional assembly. The election was run under 
the auspices of the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI). The major political groups that 
participated in the election were the religiously-oriented Shi‘i groups—the SCIRI, al-Da’wa, and the 
INC; the secular Shi‘i groups—the INA, and other groups; the Kurdistan Alliance, which was 
dominated by the KDP and the PUK, and the Sunnis, which was primarily just the Iraqi Islamic Party 
(IIP). Of the religiously-oriented Shi‘i parties, the newly formed (as of 8 December 2004) United Iraqi 
Alliance (UIA) dominated the Shi‘i ticket.280 
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Iraqis at a polling station in Sadr City on election day in January 2005, taken by the American war photographer Chris 
Hondros.281 
SCIRI was led by ‘Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim’s brother and the INC 
by Chalabi, which was severely weakened. Ayad Allawi was invited to join the religious Shi‘i groups, 
but he refused, opting to stay with the INA. The primary goal of these religiously-oriented groups was 
to keep a Shi‘i majority in the government so that they could continue to influence the direction of the 
new order. The INA, led by Allawi, ran under the Iraqi Nationalist List coalition, or as it was better 
known, al-Iraqiyyah. Finally, there was no significant participation of the Sunnis, religious or secular, 
on the election ticket, as many Sunnis boycotted the election in the wake of Fallujah II in November 
of 2004. As a result, they won very few seats.282 The results of the provincial assemblies were nearly the 
                                               
281. Chris Hondros, “100 moments from the Iraq War,” CNN, May 22, 2015, 
https://www.cnn.com/2013/03/15/world/gallery/iraq-war/index.html. 
282. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 227–8. The results in the National Assembly were: 140 seats (fifty-one 
percent of the Assembly) to the UIA, seventy-five seats to the Kurdistan Alliance (twenty-seven percent), forty seats to al-
Iraqiyyah (fourteen percent), and six seats to the Sunnis (two percent). 
Bader 100 
same as the National Assembly, though the localized power vacuums and growth of sectarian groups 
made it difficult for the newly-elected representatives to gain local recognition and influence over their 
constituents.283 
 
The Ja’fari government, May 2005–May 2006 
 The second IIG was led by Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Ja’fari of al-Da’wa. The process of 
forming this government took ninety-three days and it was not sworn in until 20 May 2005; the 
internal divisions in the IIG, primarily within the UIA over the Prime Minster, were at the root of the 
delay. Unlike the first IIG, the second had to adhere to ethnic and sectarian muhassasas, or quotas: of 
the thirty-eight cabinet positions, eighteen must be Shi‘i, eight Kurdish, and six Sunni.284 Before the 
December 2005 election, the IIG passed the new constitution by referendum on 15 October.285 In the 
campaign period leading up to the election, there was a steep rise in the number of assassinations and 
armed attacks on political figures, mostly on Sunni politicians. Then, just a few days after the 
constitutional referendum had passed, on 19 October, Saddam Hussein’s trial for crimes against 
humanity began. The MNF increased the number of troops to 160,000 and an effort to eradicate 
insurgents from the Sunni cities along the Euphrates River began.286 The first election was conducted 
under the 15 June 2004 election law that established a single-district, nationwide, proportional system 
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of representation. In other words, the first election was “closed list,” meaning that voters chose the 
party, and then the party chose the individual who would serve in the elected seat.287 The second 
election, however, was conducted on the basis of a two-tier system of representation, which was an 
open list system. Under this system, voters chose their representatives directly.288 
There was much controversy over who was to replace Ja’fari as prime minister. Eventually, a 
compromise was reached with the appointment of Nuri al-Maliki of al-Da’wa as the next Prime 
Minister. Maliki had fled to Syria from Iraq in 1979, as had many other members of al-Da’wa, and had 
returned after the regime fell. On 22 April 2006, the Council of Representatives (CoR) approved Jalal 
Talabani as president and Mahmoud al-Mashhadami of Tawafiq as chairman of the CoR. Talabani 
then nominated Maliki as Prime Minister, and on 20 May, Maliki and his thirty-seven-person cabinet 
were approved by parliament.289 
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THE ESCALATION INTO VIOLENCE 
Opposition to the occupation: Shi‘i elements 
In order to understand the emergence and development of the opposition groups, it is 
necessary to go back to the first days of the U.S.290 The Shi‘i elements of the opposition to the 
occupation were primarily focused on highlighting the discrimination they had faced in the past and 
the need for a unified Shi‘i majority government. Though some of these Shi‘i groups did participate in 
the political process, many groups and some powerful individuals led significant opposition campaigns 
against the U.S. The four main sources of opposition were the SCIRI, al-Da’wa, the Sadrists, and the 
Fadhila (Virtue) Party, which was a Sadrist offshoot. The SCIRI was led by Muhammad Baqir al-
Hakim before his murder in August of 2003. He believed that SCIRI was at the forefront of the 
movement to create a Shi‘i-dominated Islamic republic as the “new Iraq” and likened himself to 
something of a “political marja.”291 
The Sadrists, led by Muqtada al-Sadr since his father’s assassination in 1999, emerged as a 
vitriolic force during the Iraq War. Muqtada’s father, Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr laid the foundation 
for the Sadrist movement, but it was not until Muqtada took over the movement that he was able to 
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truly mobilize the masses against the occupation and other sectarian factions within Iraq. The Sadrist 
movement primarily appealed to the poorer tribes and marsh dwellers of ‘Amarrah and Nasiriyah, and 
to the poor Shi‘is in Saddam City (a densely-populated suburb of Baghdad) and Basrah. Despite the 
U.S.’s watchful eye, the first major act of aggression came just weeks after the invasion. On 3 April 
2003, U.S. forces flew ‘Abd al-Majid al-Khu’i, a Shi‘i cleric living in exile and the son of the influential 
Shi‘i cleric Grand Ayatollah ‘Abd al-Qasim al-Khu’i, to Najaf to serve as a liaison between Shi‘i groups 
in the south. On 10 April, a mob attacked and brutally murdered Khu’i in an assassination that the 
U.S. suspected Muqtada ordered. The next day, Muqtada gave his first post-war sermon at his mosque 
in Kufa, where he announced that he was renaming Saddam City Sadr City in honor of his father. A 
week later in his second post-war sermon, Muqtada declared his opposition to the occupation and 
spoke critically of other Shi‘i leaders who had been living in exile during the Saddam years, especially 
leaders from within SCIRI and al-Da’wa.292 Over the summer of 2003, Muqtada announced the 
establishment of the Mahdi Army, the Sadrist militia; by the fall, the Mahdi Army had begun 
mounting attacks on Coalition forces. 
On 11 October, amid clashes with SCIRI in Karbala, Muqtada proclaimed the formation of 
his own government. By early 2004, reports emerged that the Sadrists had begun taking over mosques 
and universities in Baghdad, established Sharia courts for the local population and enforced Islamic 
law. The reports also stated that the Sadrists had begun more formal military training and that their 
bomb-making abilities had increased.293 Soon after, Judge Ra’id Juhi, the same young judge who later 
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presided over Saddam’s trial, announced that he had found evidence of Muqtada’s involvement in the 
murder of Khu’i and the CPA issued an arrest warrant for him shortly after.294 In response to this 
announcement, thousands of Muqtada supporters from Baghdad occupied key CPA buildings in 
Najaf, Kufa, Nasiriyah, and ‘Amarrah, and in Kut and Nasiriyah, the Sadrists also occupied the CPA 
headquarters. Meanwhile, Muqtada took refuge in the shrine in Najaf.295 
Many other Shi‘i groups were concerned that the Sadrists’ hostility towards the U.S. would 
hamper their ability to participate in the political process and their ambitions to gain power in the new 
government. Because of this, these groups were willing to cooperate with the CPA and the coalition 
forces to combat Muqtada and the Sadrists. On 5 May 2004, U.S. forces began an assault on the 
Mahdi Army in Najaf. The Mahdi Army, though it had begun to formally train, was still a 
paramilitary group with little expertise and was quickly decimated by U.S. forces. In August, an MNF 
patrol was attacked by Sadrists forces near Muqtada’s house in Najaf and violent fighting broke out 
between the two groups, resulting in hundreds of deaths, mostly of Sadrists and civilians caught in the 
crossfire. On 26 August, Muqtada realized the likelihood that his forces would be unable to stave off 
serious attacks by the MNF and struck a deal with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The meant that al-
Sistani would take over the shrine in Najaf in exchange for the Mahdi Army’s retreat. As a result of the 
deal, Muqtada’s position was severely weakened.296 
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Opposition to the occupation: Sunni elements 
The center of the Sunni opposition to the occupation was in the Sunni Arab triangle that 
included Baghdad, Anbar, Salahaldin, and other former Saddam strongholds. Of the groups that 
opposed the occupation, Hayat al-‘Ulama al-Muslimin, or the Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS) 
was particularly hostile. AMS was founded in the wake of the invasion in April 2003 and led by Harith 
al-Dhari. The group emphasized its sectarian identity as a religious Sunni group, had nationalist 
elements reminiscent of the Ba’th Party, and developed a governing principle they called fiqh al-
muqawama (“the jurisprudence of resistance”). The AMS’s chief ideologue, Muhammad ‘Ayash al-
Kubaisi, proclaimed a jihad and fard al-‘ayn, which is the obligatory duty of all believers to take part in 
jihad. Eventually the AMS developed into an insurgent group, headquartered at the Umm al-Maarik 
mosque in Baghdad, which it renamed Umm al-Qura, “The Mother of All Cities,” in reference to the 
Qur’anic name for Mecca.297 
Former Ba’thists increasingly emphasized their sectarian identity as Shi‘i and Kurdish-led 
sectarian groups in Iraq grew in power. At the height of the Ba’th Party under Saddam Hussein, most 
political Sunni actors avoided identifying with any sort of sectarian characterization. Most of the 
Ba’thists elements of the insurgency were former Republican Guard or Fedayeen Saddam members.298 
These were the type of groups the CPA mistakenly thought that the de-Ba’thification order would 
eradicate, not empower. These groups were also strengthened by the fairly recent training they had 
received before the fall of the regime. In the fall of 2002, the Ba’thists had trained about 1,000 
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intelligence officers in guerilla warfare and terrorist tactics.299 Jaysh Muhammad, or the Army of 
Muhammad, for example, was supposedly led by the ex-Republican Guard chief of staff and ran a 
deadly campaign against Coalition forces.300 
The majority of Sunnis refused to participate in the political process and opted instead to join 
the growing and active insurgency. Of the ten or so most prominent insurgent groups that could be 
identified, the most important were, in addition to the Army of Muhammad: Jaysh al-Islami al-Iraqi 
(The Islamic Party of Iraq), Jaysh ‘Umar (The Army of Omar), and Kataib Thawrat al-‘Ashrin (The 
Battalions of the 1920 Uprising).301 The few Western-oriented Sunni groups were all secular and were 
generally willing to join the political process as the route to gaining power. The most prominent of 
these groups was the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), one of the few Sunni groups on the election ticket in 
2005.302 
 
THE SUNNI INSURGENCY 
The first stage: The development of the insurgency 
The social and political elite of Iraq up until 2003 was overwhelming Sunni Arabs. This 
position of power and influence dated back to before the creation of the modern-state of Iraq, when 
the Mesopotamia Province was under the control of the Ottoman Empire. The U.S.-led invasion in 
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2003 ended the dominance of the Sunni elite over the state. Not all Sunni Arabs were in the upper 
echelons of Iraqi society, but most, if not all, of the most powerful individuals and groups in Iraq were 
Sunni Arabs. In particular, the de-Ba’thification order ended centuries of Sunni Arab hegemony in 
Iraq. The Sunni insurgency was a rejection of the foreign occupation and rule that cut Sunni Arabs 
from official positions in the government, and a reaction to the increasingly sectarian basis of rule. 
These grievances were further exacerbated by violent clashes with U.S. forces. The incident that was 
particularly galvanizing for the insurgency was on 28 April 2003, when U.S. forces shot at 
demonstrators in city of Fallujah, killing seventeen people and wounding about seventy more.303 
The most important elements of the insurgency were found in mosques (which is to say, 
religiously-oriented Sunni groups based out of mosques), in former Ba’thists and military officers, and 
in foreign elements, primarily those associated with al-Qa’ida. Among the former, the Association of 
Muslim Scholars (AMS) rapidly developed into a network of Sunni imams and clerics. The AMS grew 
into an insurgent group when it began to urge Sunnis to resist the occupation and object to any form 
of participation in the occupying powers’ government. The other major player within the mosques’ 
network were the Salafist fundamentalist groups, primarily the Army of Muhammad. Groups such as 
these were conservative, generally with a religiously-imbued militant ideology that was heavily 
influenced by Wahhabi ideas from Saudi Arabia. The Ba’thist contingent of the insurgents functioned 
primarily within tribal networks and included Ba’thists from the military, intelligence, and police 
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forces. With the high rates of unemployment as a result of CPA Orders One and Two, this sector of 
the insurgency was highly successful in recruiting the young and unemployed into their ranks.304 
The third group making up the Sunni insurgency was foreigners that were primarily associated 
with al-Qa’ida. These groups capitalized upon the local opposition to the occupation to grow their 
forces. The most powerful and influential of these groups was led by Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, a 
Jordanian-born jihadist who had already been linked to terrorist activities in his home country, had ran 
a paramilitary training camp in Afghanistan at the end of the Soviet-Afghan War, and had a strong 
association with al-Qa’ida. He was joined by the Ansar al-Islam members who had fled Iraqi Kurdistan 
at the beginning of the war and returned, along with other foreign Islamists, most of whom were from 
Syria. This group, which eventually developed into al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), was known for its “highly 
puritan” interpretation of Islam that was distinctly foreign from any Islamic movement Iraq had ever 
experienced before.305 Unlike the other Sunni insurgent groups, AQI’s objective was not only to 
overthrow the U.S. regime in Iraq, but to establish a transnational Islamic emirate.306 
 
The second stage: The intensification of the insurgency 
By the summer of 2003, reports from Iraq indicated that as many as 30,000 men were part of 
underground militias. At the time, however, these militias were still largely unorganized, and their 
actions were sporadic. It was not until a series of bombings orchestrated by AQI that the insurgency 
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was truly set on its violent course, in the first stage of the escalation. The first bombing was on 7 
August, at the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad and killed eighteen people. The second car bombing 
was on 19 August, at the U.N. mission headquarters at the Canal Hotel in Bagdad.307 The bomb killed 
twenty-two people, including the U.N. envoy, Sergio de Mello. Witnesses of the bombing said that a 
truck drove directly below de Mello’s office and then detonated; the attack was the worst in U.N. 
history. Then, on 24 August, Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sa’id al-Hakim was injured by a bomb 
that detonated as he was leaving evening prayers at his mosque in Najaf. A second explosion went off 
later that night that killed three guards. The perpetrator(s) of the attack never claimed responsibility—
which is often the case after such events—but the Sadrists were suspected to be responsible.308 
The fourth and most catastrophic in this series of bombings was on 29 August, when an AQI 
bomb detonated as worshipers were leaving the Imam ‘Ali Mosque in Najaf. The attack killed one 
hundred people, including Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, the head of SCIRI. The death of 
al-Hakim was a huge hit to the SCIRI, which had placed its hopes in him to lead the way to Iraqi 
sovereignty. Hakim had returned to Najaf only four months earlier, after living in exile in Iran. 
According to Engel, a journalist who lived in Baghdad for the majority of the Iraq War, the violence 
against Shi‘is was in reaction to the belief that Shi‘i groups were waiting in the wings to take control as 
soon as the U.S. left Iraq.309 While Hakim had formally opposed the occupation, he was still willing to 
cooperate with the CPA in the hope that SCIRI would be influential in the new Iraqi government. 
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Hakim was not only influential within political circles but was highly revered among Shi‘i Iraqis; 
nearly half a million people attended his funeral procession in Najaf.310 After the bombing, members 
of the Badr Brigade flooded into the streets of Najaf with assault rifles, set up checkpoints, and made 
threats to foreign journalists in the city. The U.S. made not abject efforts to curb this.311 The final 
attack that fully propelled Iraq into the insurgency was on 22 September, when another bomb 
detonated at the U.N. headquarters. The bomb was placed in the parking lot of the Canal Hotel and 
killed several Iraqi policemen. The U.N. directors in Baghdad unanimously recommended to U.N. 
Secretary General Kofi Annan that all U.N. staff in Iraq be evacuated from the country immediately. 
The directors had seriously considered pulling U.N. staff from Iraq after the August bombing, but 
were still undecided when the September bombing cemented their decision. Annan accepted, but left 
thirty U.N. staffers in the country. Nevertheless, the evacuation of U.N. staff meant that the U.N. had 
effectively withdrawn from Iraq.312 
The second stage in the escalation of the insurgency came in October of 2003, when photos 
from within the Abu Ghraib prison were leaked to the press. The photographs of the torture and 
humiliating treatment of Iraqi detainees by U.S. military police forces incensed not only anti-war 
advocates in the West but also the bulk of Iraqis. Sunni Arabs in Iraq saw this as damning evidence of a 
hostile occupation and further galvanized elements of the insurgency. By the next month, attacks by 
insurgent groups had increased. The groups mostly carried out political assassinations and attacks on 
Coalition forces, using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) aimed at convoys. Attacks on water and oil 
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installations, which would be crucial to any nation-building mission, also increased.313 Kurdish 
elements were forced to face the insurgency when, on 1 February 2004, suicide bombers attacked the 
KDP and PUK headquarters in Erbil, killing many high officials, including Sami ‘Abd al-Rahman, the 
deputy director of the KRG and a member of the KDP. The bombing propelled the Kurds towards 
Kurdish efforts to gain autonomy from the rest of Iraq. The final escalation toward a total outbreak of 
the insurgency came on 1 March, when four Blackwater mercenaries, contracted by the U.S., were 
ambushed in Fallujah after making a wrong turn on a routine patrol. The four men were brutally 
murdered; the absolute brutality of their murder is best exemplified in the highly-published 
photograph of Iraqis cheering with the Americans’ charred remains hanging from a bridge in the 
background.314 
 
The third stage: Fallujah I & II 
A day before the U.S. assaults in Fallujah began, the Mahdi Army in Sadr City ambushed U.S. 
troops on a patrol on one of the bloodiest days of the War. The Siege of Sadr City, which began on 
“Black Sunday,” lasted for four years.315 The Coalition forces’ assault on the insurgent elements began 
in full force on 5 April 2004 when U.S. Marines launched their siege of Fallujah. The assault on 
Fallujah was not only a reaction to the insurgency at large, but a direct retaliation for the murder of the 
Blackwater mercenaries.316 The move incensed most Sunnis and created tension within the IGC; soon 
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after the launch of Fallujah I, two Sunni members of the IGC resigned.317 The U.S. Marines were 
joined by the newly created Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), but the ISF’s lack of experience became 
obvious when the first unit that was deployed to join the fight deserted and the second unit refused to 
even entertain the thought of joining the Marines. The fighting that ensued caught many civilians in 
the crossfire. The images of the city in the midst of the assault were captured by an Al-Jazeera 
correspondent and were seen on television across the Arab World. Bremer and the CPA forces were 
forced to confront the fact that Fallujah I had done more to encourage the insurgents than it had to 
weaken the insurgency. By 9 April 2004, the CPA announced a unilateral ceasefire and General 
Muhammad Shahwani, the director of the new Iraqi security and intelligence services (INIS)—which 
was funded by the U.S. and had direct ties to the CIA—began secret negotiations on behalf of the 
Coalition forces.318 Though the ceasefire had been announced, General James Conway, the Marines’ 
commander for western Iraq, met with senior Iraqi officials regarding a humanitarian plan, which 
suggested that the U.S. forces were planning more assaults.319 
Fallujah I led to a high number of civilian casualties, incredible damage of the city’s 
infrastructure, and served as a “rallying cry” for the Sunni opposition groups.320 Although the most 
intense fighting of the insurgency was in Fallujah, fighting quickly spread to the other cities in the 
Sunni Arab triangle around Baghdad, including Ramadi, Haditha, and Mosul. The religiously-
oriented Sunni groups, which were soon joined by the fighters that had flooded in from Jordan, Saudi 
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Arabia, and Yemen, enforced “draconian religious measures” onto the local population in Fallujah.321 
When the violence increased, Prime Minister Ayad Allawi agreed—albeit reluctantly—to allow 
Coalition forces to mount another assault on Fallujah. On 7 November 2004, MNF forces reentered 
the city in what came to be known as “Fallujah II.”322 
Fallujah II was incredibly bloody: ninety-two U.S. soldiers, about 1,200 insurgents, and about 
6,000 civilian were killed; and about 200,000 people fled the city in a massive internal displacement. 
The battle also destroyed much of the city’s infrastructure. Sixty of the city’s 200 mosques and twenty 
percent of the buildings in the city were destroyed. Fallujah II stirred tensions within Allawi’s 
government and the members of the IIP, the only significant Sunni party represented in the cabinet, 
resigned. The resigned members and other Sunni opposition groups led a campaign to boycott the 
upcoming election of January of 2005 to a high degree of success. As a result, Sunni representation 
within the government was further weakened. The government of Allawi as a whole was also 
weakened greatly as internal divisions within the cabinet deepened and both Sunni and Shi‘i militias 
grew in size and power.323 
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THE SECTARIAN CIVIL WAR 
Roots of the civil war: Towards communal violence 
The assaults in Fallujah in April and November 2004 began a new phase of the insurgency. 
Sunni attacks on Shi‘i sites in Najaf, mostly perpetrated by AQI, heightened tensions further. The 
elections in 2005 were of no help, as they appeared to confirm Sunni fears that they would be 
completely pushed out of the political process in favor of the U.S.-backed Shi‘i groups (in particular, 
religiously-oriented Shi‘i groups). This led to anxiety and urgency among Sunni opposition groups to 
take immediate action against the occupation and prominent Shi‘i leaders, resorting to violence and 
terrorist tactics if need be. These fears were well justified: not only did Shi‘i leaders hold power in the 
IGC and then in the IIG, but most of the security apparatus was under Shi‘i control, specifically, the 
Badr Brigade of SCIRI. Prior to his assassination, Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim had even called for a 
separate regional government in the south and center of the country. Sunni Arabs who had long been 
in power clearly saw their position of power slipping from their grip.324 
Shi‘i groups immediately felt the impact of the Sunni backlash against their growing power. 
Zarqawi’s al-Qa’ida-associated network rebranded itself as al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI). While coalition 
forces were able to control Muqtada’s Mahdi Army with the help of Ali al-Sistani, AQI was a powerful 
and destructive force that no one appeared to be able to control. Then following the Fallujah 
campaigns of 2004, a massive outpouring of civilians from Fallujah fled to the western suburbs of 
Baghdad, including Ghazaliyah and Abu Ghraib, and to Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad, such as 
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Adamiyah. By 2005, Shi‘i families were being driven out of the Sunni-majority neighborhoods in 
Baghdad en masse. Violence quickly erupted between the Sunni fundamentalist groups and the Shi‘i 
militias, sweeping up the civilian population into the mix.325 
 
Course of the civil war 
In January of 2006 alone, 700 murders were reported in Baghdad, the highest number in a 
single month up until that point.326 On 22 February 2006, Amid the chaos in the government and 
attempts to create some semblance of unity, an AQI bomb destroyed the al-‘Askari shrine in Samarra. 
The shrine, where the tombs of the tenth and eleventh Imams are located and where Shi‘is believe that 
the twelfth Imam went into occultation, was an incredibly important site for Shi‘i Muslims. Within 
hours, Shi‘i militias took to the streets and in a sudden burst of violence, about 1,300 civilians, mostly 
Sunnis, were killed. The violence continued over the next week as Shi‘i militias continued to turn on 
Sunnis, despite calls from Shi‘i clerics to refrain from responding violently to the bombing.327  
Tensions between Sunnis and Shi‘is had been growing since the first days of the insurgency, spurred 
forward by deadly instances of violence, but this particular moment seems to have been the catalyzing 
moment for a full-blown civil war between Sunni and Shi‘i civilians in Iraq, primarily centered in 
Baghdad.328 
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Zarqawi, the leader of AQI, reportedly described in a February 2004 letter to Osama bin 
Laden, published in The New York Times, his specific anti-Shi‘i objectives for AQI. In this letter and in 
other communications from AQI, it became clear that AQI’s express objective was to stir up a civil war 
between Sunni and Shi‘i Iraqis that would cause the collapse of the occupation and the new Iraqi 
regime, preparing the way for a complete takeover by AQI. On 7 June 2006, Zarqawi was killed in 
Ba’qua by MNF and ISF strikes, but the group continued to grow in strength and influence.329 By 
mid-2006, Shi‘i groups had the clear upper hand in the fight against Sunni insurgents. The Mahdi 
Army and the Badr Brigade, in particular, took over mixed neighborhoods in Baghdad, attacking 
mosques and markets, and launched brutal assaults on civilians, nearly cleansing entire neighborhoods 
of all Sunnis. These actions led to the outbreak of a full-scale sectarian civil war. This stage of the 
violence was different than the previous stages in that it can be defined by the communal violence by 
civilians against civilians330 
The civil war in Baghdad left civilians with the choice to either affiliate with a militia for their 
own protection or to leave Baghdad or even the country. The flow of refugees from the country and 
internally displaced people from Baghdad was estimated to be in the millions; an end-of-the-year U.N. 
estimate for 2006 placed the death toll at 34,400.331 In October of 2006, a report in a respected British 
medical journal estimated that between March 2003 and July 2006, the death toll may have been more 
than 650,000 people.332 In the same journal, The Lancet, a report estimated that an estimated one 
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hundred Iraqi civilians were killed every day between 2006 and 2007.333 By 2007, entire neighborhoods 
were reduced to rubble. Perhaps the only solace in this time of great violence was for victims of the 
Saddam regime: on 5 November 2006, an Iraqi judge sentenced Saddam Hussein to death for crimes 
against humanity and on 30 December, prime minister Nuri al-Maliki signed the execution order.334 
According to Tripp, seldom few Iraqis, if any, felt sympathy for Saddam as they watched the televised 
hearings. Saddam apparently believed that he could mobilize the masses to support him, but none 
did.335 As officials were preparing for the execution, Muqtada al-Sadr loyalists and Saddam exchanged 
insults at each other, the former mostly military guards standing among the crowd and the latter atop 
the scaffolding.336 
 
THE U.S. TROOP SURGE AND THE SUBSIDING OF THE CIVIL WAR 
On 10 January 2007, President Bush ordered a “surge” of 50,000 more U.S. troops that would 
primarily deploy to Baghdad. In March, the new U.S. ambassador, Ryan Crocker, arrived in Baghdad. 
Crocker, unlike previous ambassadors, spoke fluent Arabic and had experience in the Arab World, 
including Iraq, prior to his appointment. Crocker’s arrival came at a turning point in the civil war 
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when splits were emerging on both the Sunni and Shi‘i side. The internal divisions were a sign that the 
end of the civil war could be soon.337 
 
Changes on the Sunni front 
 In October of 2006, AQI announced the establishment of the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) in the 
Anbar and Ninawa provinces. Its stated objectives were to establish the Islamic Caliphate in Iraq, not 
as a singular, independent state, but rather as a transnational empire. The majority of the other Sunni 
groups had no desire for a transnational caliphate and were focused on achieving a Sunni majority 
within Iraq only. Moreover, AQI’s activities were not only violent but also disrupted Iraq’s major 
black market, of which many tribal leaders were a part. However, the primary reason for Sunni groups’ 
total denunciation of AQI was the absolute outrage at its brutal tactics. The Sunni groups were never 
in favor of the AQI, but the type of violence the AQI used against both Sunni and Shi‘i civilians 
pushed them to make a public renouncement of the group. Some of these tribal groups were so 
incensed with AQI that they were willing to work with U.S. forces to push the group out of their cities 
and towns.338 
A Sunni-born movement to push AQI out of key regions in Iraq began in September 2005, 
when the chief of the Albu Risha clan in Ramadi, ‘Abd al-Sattar Abu Risha, began enlisting tribesmen 
into a local force to combat the AQI and encouraged others to join the local police force. This effort 
was initiated by the Sahwa (Awakening) movement, developing into the Anbar Salvation Council, a 
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coalition of anti-AQI tribal groups. By the spring of 2007, more than forty tribal groups had joined the 
Anbar Salvation Council and had managed to push AQI out of the region. By May, after its success in 
pushing AQI out of Amiriyah and Diylah, Sahwa began its move into Baghdad with the help of the 
MNF. A couple of months later, the MNF had gained the cooperation of four tribal groups and by 
September, the MNF turned over control of the city to those groups. Local councils emerged, which 
called themselves Sons of Iraq (SOI) or Concerned Local Citizens. These councils were put on the 
U.S.’s payroll, which was a major boost to the local economy and lowered unemployment.339 
 
Changes on the Shi‘i front 
 Since Muqtada al-Sadr had made a deal with Sistani back in August of 2004, the power of the 
Mahdi Army and the Sadrists had significantly subsided, as had the violence emanating from their 
ranks. Shi‘i groups that had formerly been associated with Muqtada began to peel off and form 
Iranian-backed militia groups called “Special Groups.” Some of the groups operated independently, 
but the majority of these Special Groups eventually developed into a militia called the Asa’ib Ahl al-
Haqq, or “The League of the Righteous.” In early 2007, the Sadrists’ position was further weakened 
when they withdrew from Nuri al-Maliki’s cabinet following a disagreement with the Prime Minster 
over the timeline for the U.S. troops’ withdrawal. Without the Sadrists, Maliki turned to SCIRI as a 
key ally among the religious Shi‘i groups.340 
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The religiously-oriented Shi‘i groups began to fracture as well. In May of 2007, SCIRI 
renamed itself to the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). Splits within ISCI led to the creation of 
a separate group, called the Badr Organization. On 27 August 2007, the Sadrists provoked the ISCI in 
Karbala during the Shi‘i holiday of the ‘Ashura, when the city was packed to the brim with pilgrims; 
the ensuing two-day battle killed fifty civilians. Following the incident in Karbala, Maliki visited the 
city and gave the police chief the full power to take action against the Sadrists and the Mahdi Army. 
Muqtada’s reputation was even more dampened as a result. Two days after the first fighting broke out, 
Muqtada announced a ceasefire, ordered that the Mahdi Army to refrain from firing at MNF forces, 
signed a pact with the ISCI, and announced that he would remain in Iran, where he had traveled to 
Iran for religious training.341 
 
The outcome of the civil war 
By the end of 2007, violence had declined by ninety percent and the end of the civil war was in 
sight. Only the Special Groups had continued violent activities in Baghdad. The ISF had grown to 
about 140,000 troops and were now much better trained and managed than when the ISF was 
established. The ISF, together with the designated 50,000 U.S. troops and 103,000 SOI members, 
contributed in significantly lowering the prevalence of violence.342 In Baghdad, walls and military 
barriers were erected to separate neighborhoods by their ethnosectarian identity, a physically startling 
but effective method to curb violence. Though the civil war seemed to be coming to an end, the years 




of the Iraq War and the civil war in Baghdad had created a refugee population of two million people 
and by 2008 1.6 million had been internally displaced. Although violence had subsided in Baghdad, its 
population had developed a deep sense of distrust and anxiety towards each other in a city whose 
mixed population had been historically tolerant.343 
  
                                               








The New Iraq: 





While the roots of the Islamic State (IS) lie in non-state actors from outside of Iraq, the growth 
of the insurgent, terrorist movement is inextricable from the post-2003 development of the Iraqi state. 
With that being said, the roots of IS are not confined to just the post-2003 era, but rather harken back 
to the generations of sectarian politics, exclusion, and repression discussed in previous chapters. This 
chapter will look at the development of IS in Iraq from the point of view of the Iraqi state, rather than 
from the point of view of the non-state actors within IS itself. This chapter will examine how the 
actions of the state, primarily by orders of the Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, are crucial factors to 
understanding how the Islamic State evolved from al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) to the Islamic State in Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS), and finally, the so-called Islamic Caliphate. 
 
NURI AL-MALIKI’S AUTOCRATIC REGIME 
The civil war, which was particularly acute in Baghdad’s mixed neighborhoods, but certainly 
not confined to the city, technically came to an end in the last months of 2007, as indicated by the 
substantial reduction of violence. However, bombings targeted at civilians remained commonplace. 
To discuss each and every incident would take this chapter far beyond its objectives, and therefore, it 
will only focus on key moments of violence that spurred state action or furthered communal violence 
in a significant way. This section will examine how the Prime Minister, Nuri al-Maliki, consolidated 
his power in the period following the civil war, how his repression of both Sunni and Shi‘i actors led to 
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increased ethnosectarian tensions, and how the exclusion of Sunnis in particular played a key role in 
the emergence of the Islamic State. 
 
Maliki’s consolidation of power: The Shi‘i front 
Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army and Sadrist movement experienced a resurgence at the end of 
the civil war and reemerged as a powerful player in the southern wilayat. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, Muqtada al-Sadr’s movement took a serious hit in 2004 when he struck a deal with the 
powerful Shi‘i cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. During the course of the civil war the Sadrist 
movement reemerged as a threat even to other Shi‘i parties such as the Islamic Supreme Council in 
Iraq (ISCI). Following a bout of violence between the Mahdi Army and the ISCI in Karbala, Muqtada 
called a ceasefire and announced that he would remain in Iran, where he had traveled to for religious 
study. However, after the civil war it became clear to Maliki and other state actors that Muqtada was 
aggressively attempting to incorporate members of the Mahdi Army and other Sadrists into the local 
police forces and into the interior ministry in Basrah and Sadr City.344 Maliki planned a military 
intervention in Basrah and Sadr City in order to—at least publicly—curb the control of the militias 
that posed a threat to the government and to civilians. Privately, it was clear that the military action 
was directed exclusively at Muqtada and his Mahdi Army.345 
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The incursion began on 25 March 2008 in Basrah, when Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) entered 
the neighborhood of al-Ta‘miyyah, which was a Sadrist stronghold. According to reports on the 
events, there were nearly 30,000 combined forces, 16,000 of which were local police forces and the rest 
of which were the ISF.346 The fighting between the Sadrists and the Iraqi forces spread to other 
neighborhoods and erupted in Sadr City as well, but the ISF was weakened by the high number of 
deserters and defectors.347 The incident devolved into a stalemate within days and on 30 March 2008, 
Muqtada announced a ceasefire after negotiations with Iraqi officials in Iran.348 On 24 April, Maliki 
announced that the government had regained control over Basrah, but fighting continued in both the 
city and in Sadr City until 11 May.349 Reports from Basrah indicated that the armed incursion into 
Basrah was highly unpopular among Iraqis—at least among high officials—and was seen as 
unnecessary for national security, considering violence had decreased, and more as Maliki taking 
personal revenge against Muqtada.350 
 
Maliki’s consolidation of power: The Sunni front 
In the time since Maliki had first become Prime Minister in 2005, he had made it increasingly 
clear that he was not keen on incorporating Sunni representation into his government, or to even on 
entertaining the idea. One clear example of this was his explicit exclusion of the Sahwa and the Sons of 
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Iraq (SOI) from the Iraqi security forces. Before handing over military control to the Iraqis, the 
Americans had put the Sahwa and the SOI on the U.S. payroll in an attempt to quell the AQI. Most of 
the fighters in the Sahwa and the SOI had participated in the Sunni insurgency in 2004 and Maliki 
regarded them as no more than a non-state militia to be controlled, and, as the ICG put it, “thugs at 
best and Sunni terrorists at worst, a potential fifth column ensconced in state security forces.”351 Not 
only did Maliki refuse to incorporate the Sahwa and the SOI into the security forces, but he began to 
order the arrests of various key leaders in the Sahwa and the SOI, all of whom were Sunni. One of the 
key leaders arrested was Saif Sa’ad Ahmad al-Ubaidi (or Abu Abid), the SOI leader in Amiriyyah. 
Ubaidi’s growing power and influence extended beyond Amiriyyah to Baghdad and the Sunni Arab 
triangle and posed a threat to Maliki. In mid-2008, Ubaidi was charged with murder while he was out 
of the country; his property was confiscated, and he was forced to remain in exile outside of Iraq. Later 
that year, Maliki began to order the arrests of other leaders, mostly in Diyalah, and froze the program 
that U.S. had set up for the inclusion of these Sunni fighters.352 
 Maliki was also disproportionally brutal in his repression of Sunni protestors against 
his premiership. Security forces were deployed to Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad, as well as in the 
Sunni-majority wilayat of Anbar, Salah al-Din, Ninawa, Kirkuk, and Diyalah, in far higher numbers 
than they were anywhere else.353 In a Frontline documentary on the rise of the Islamic State, several 
people, from former cabinet members to British intelligence officers, confirmed Maliki’s use of his 
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own Golden Division militia to violently repress the Sunni Arab protest movements. Richard Barrett, 
a former British intelligence officer posted to Iraq, observed that, “the Shi‘i militia were very, very 
violent. There were many, many instances in Baghdad, and in many other parts of Iraq, of Sunnis 
turning up with a bullet in the back of their head and their hands bound behind them.”354 The Maliki 
government not only deployed militias and security forces to repress rivals in Sunni areas, but it also 
restricted the power of the local police forces and cut funding for public works and infrastructure 
projects.355 
 
The 2009 provincial elections 
The provincial elections of 2009 were the first nationwide elections in which there was a 
significant number of Sunnis on the election ticket and Sunni voter turnout since Sunni Arabs had 
largely boycotted the December 2005 election. Though this was an important factor in the political 
landscape, perhaps more important were the results. These results, both nationwide and within the 
provinces, were highly fragmented; no single list obtained anything close to a majority of seats. 
Further, local incumbent parties lost their positions: in fourteen out of Iraq’s eighteen wilayat voters 
voted out the incumbent party.356 Maliki, the incumbent Prime Minister, ran as part of his own State 
of Law list, rather than on al-Da’wa’s list, the religiously-oriented Shi‘i party under which he had 
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previously run. If there was any one group that did obtain a success, then it was certainty the State of 
Law, which won seats nationwide. A report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) postulated that 
the State of Law and Maliki’s success likely stemmed from the fact that many Shi‘i Arabs were 
discontent and incensed with the increasingly violent tactics that the Sadrists—and the Islamic 
Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), by association—employed.357 The results of the provincial elections 
in 2009 was to create an even more fragmented sociopolitical landscape based on ethnosectarian 
identities. 
 
The 2010 elections 
In the months leading up to the early-2010 elections, daily bombings became so commonplace 
that they became normalized. Observations from on the ground showed how Iraqis tried their best to 
go on with their daily routines despite the violence on the streets. But there were three bombings in 
particular, likely all perpetrated by AQI, that severely undercut Maliki’s rule and his claims to lead an 
era of “law and order” in Iraq.358 The first was on 19 August 2009, when coordinated truck bombs 
exploded at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance, killing 100 civilians and 
injuring nearly 600 more. This was the worst bombing since the Americans had handed over military 
control (in the cities) to the Iraqis in June 2009.359 The second was on 25 October 2009, when suicide 
car bombs exploded at the Ministry of Justice, the Baghdad Provincial Council building, and the 
                                               
357. ICG, “Iraq’s Uncertain Future,” 5. 
358. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 266. 
359. Sam Dagher, “2 Blasts Expose Security Flaws in Heart of Iraq,” The New York Times, August 19, 2009, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/20/world/middleeast/20iraq.html. 
Bader 129 
Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works. These explosions killed 155 people and wounded over 
700 in the worst attack since the summer of 2007 and took place just a few blocks away from the 
location of the August attacks.360 The final event was on 8 December 2009, when coordinated car 
bombs in at least four locations around Baghdad killed more than 127 people and injured 448. These 
attacks came just days after the new election date—which was originally scheduled for January 2010—
had been announced. This was the only set of attacks, however, for which AQI expressly claimed 
responsibility.361 
In January of 2010, just months before the election, the Supreme National Commission for 
Accountability and Justice had disqualified 511 candidates from running based on supposed 
affiliation with the Ba’th Party. The specific details of these politicians’ elimination were never 
disclosed to the public and it was widely held that the Shi‘i-majority government used the Commission 
as a way to eliminate potential threats from prominent, influential Sunni politicians.362 Violence once 
again broke out and between 12 February and 7 March 2010, the day of the election, nearly 250 people 
were killed.363 The results of the 2010 election were nearly identical to the 2009 provincial elections, 
with the exception that Ayad Allawi’s secular Shi‘i coalition, al-Iraqiyyah, gained more seats. Still, the 
elections revealed the highly fragmented nature of Iraq at that moment, since most voters voted along 
ethnosectarian lines.364 
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THE EMERGENCE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE 
The emergence of the Islamic State (IS) and its foothold in Iraq, which continues until this 
day, is a complicated subject with many interweaving and complex factors. This section will focus on 
the emergence of IS in relation to Iraqi state actions and key regional events, such as the Arab Spring 
and the civil war in Syria. The development of IS is a study within itself, so in order to keep the focus 
on IS within Iraq, this section will necessarily ignore other details. 
 
The U.S. troop withdrawal and weaknesses in the ISF 
In November of 2008, the Council of Representatives (CoR) adopted the Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA), which laid the groundwork for U.S. troop withdrawal in 2011. The SOFA 
stipulated that the last of the U.S. troops would leave Iraq by the end of 2011 and that, in the 
meantime, there would be a gradual shift of power to the ISF.365 On 1 September 2010, U.S. President 
Barack Obama declared that the U.S. combat mission in Iraq was over.366 Once the U.S. troops 
withdrew, the ISF would no longer have access to the U.S.’s intelligence apparatus nor U.S. air support 
in the fight against the extremist elements, mainly AQI. Since the end of the civil war, groups such as 
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AQI had posed the biggest threat to Iraq’s stability and security and it was unclear at the time of the 
U.S. withdrawal whether or not the ISF would be able to handle the fight against them.367 
The ISF was plagued with problems. From the beginning, its ranks had been  filled with largely 
inexperienced recruits. The de-Ba’thification order discussed in the previous chapter wiped out an 
entire echelon of mid-level military personnel who had experience.368 Further, Maliki seemed more 
interested in cultivating armed forces that were loyal to him than a skilled and seasoned military and he 
allowed oversight of the military to go by the wayside.369 Widespread corruption, distrust, and lack of 
cohesion throughout the security forces added to the growing list of problems.370 Major General 
Najim Abed al-Jabouri, quoted in an International Crisis Group report, noted that, “the ISF itself is 
the battleground in the larger communal struggle for power and survival. Middle Eastern concepts of 
civil-military relations are fundamentally different than Western concepts.”371 
 
Sunni grievances 
Just one day after the last U.S. troops left Iraqi territory, accusations emerged that the Vice 
President, Tariq al-Hashimi, a Sunni Arab, was running a “death squad” through his bodyguards. 
Maliki was in Washington, D.C. when he received the news of this supposed treason, though critics of 
                                               
367. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 279. 
368. ICG, Middle East Report No. 99, 17. 
369. Ibid., ii. 
370. Ibid., 34. The ISF was notorious for the phenomenon known as the fidhaiyeen (“those who exist in a void”) 
or tayyarah (“those who fly in and out”). These were “ghost soldiers,” or personnel that were on Iraqi state payroll but who 
either did not actually exist, or only showed up intermittently or on payday. This severely undercut a sense of coherence 
among ISF units. 
371. Quoted in ICG, Middle East Report No. 99, 18. 
Bader 132 
Maliki thought that this was likely a conspiracy of his own doing to further consolidate his power and 
push any remaining Sunnis out of high-ranking positions.372 Hashimi fled the country and was tried in 
absentia and sentenced to death.373 In a New York Times article, a Sunni Arab from Baghdad was 
quoted as saying, “Why are they only targeting Hashimi? Why don’t they target Sadr or the Mahdi 
Army?”374 This man’s comments reflect the anger and suspicion felt among many Sunni Arabs in Iraq 
that Maliki did not have the country’s best interest in mind, but rather, was only interested in growing 
his own personal (and thus also Shi‘i) power. 
Then, just over a year later, the bodyguards of another prominent Sunni minister, Rafi al-
Essawi, were arrested on terrorism charges. Again, Essawi vehemently denied the charges that he or his 
bodyguards were involved in any sort of nefarious plot against the Iraqi state. About 2,000 Sunni 
Arabs, mostly in Anbar, took to the streets in protest with the belief that Maliki was purposefully 
targeting Sunni Arabs and feared that if he went unchecked, the attacks would not stop.375 In 2013, 
when the protests continued to grow, state-led violent repression began. On 23 April 2013, an ISF raid 
of a protest camp in Hawijah in Kirkuk killed more than fifty people and injured 110. This moment 
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galvanized opposition into violence. By May of the same year, political violence had grown 
exponentially, matching the violence of the civil war of 2006 to 2007.376 
 
The Syrian civil war and the move into Iraq 
In late 2010, the Arab Spring broke out in Tunisia and spread to Syria on 20 March 2011. Due 
to the brutal response by the Assad regime, the initially peaceful protests rapidly devolved into violence 
and eventually, into a bloody civil war that is still raging today. One of the key factions that emerged in 
the first months of the civil war was the group of extremist Sunni jihadists from abroad, specifically 
Jabhat Nusra, an al-Qa’ida-affiliated group, and the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). These combined forces 
quickly gained territory in Syria and were joined by former Ba’thists from Iraq and other Sunni Arab 
dissidents from Iraq. Once it gained a stronghold in Syria, the ISI attacked what it referred to as the 
“Sykes-Picot border,” and began its move into Iraq. Soon after, ISI renamed itself the Islamic State in 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS).377 The spread of the Arab Spring to Iraq occurred just as U.S. troops were 
preparing for their December withdrawal and as discussed earlier, the ISF was ill prepared for what was 
to come.378 
As the ISI spread across the borders between the two countries, it began to network with 
Sunni tribes in the west of Iraq. As noted in an ICG report, ISI “reactivated the long dormant” tribal 
ties in the Anbar, Ninawa, and Dokuk wilayat, capitalizing upon Sunni anger and disillusionment 
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with the Maliki government to draw recruits.379 Unemployed, young, Sunni Arab men became a key 
demographic for the recruitment efforts. About 500 prisoners from Abu Ghraib and another 
Baghdad-area prison, freed by ISIS, also added to their ranks.380 Many of the ISI fighters who went to 
Syria were originally from AQI. However, ISIS’ violent strategies—beheadings, rape, and other 
terrorist tactics—led to al-Qa’ida itself disowning it.381 
In 2014, ISIS began to make significant incursions into Iraqi territory. By 10 June 2014, ISIS 
had gained control over Mosul’s airport, police stations, and central bank. ISIS fighters took control 
over the prison in Mosul and killed 670 Shi‘i inmates. About 500,000 of Mosul’s 1.8 million people 
fled the city. The same day on which ISIS gained control over key positions in Mosul, the ISF fell 
apart. 30,000 ISF troops were helpless against a mere 1,500 ISIS fighters. On 11 June 2013, ISIS took 
control of Tikrit and Camp Speicher, where they killed 1,700 Shi‘i military cadets. The next day, they 
entered the wilayat of Salah al-Din and Diyalah, moving towards Kirkuk. On 13 June, the same day 
that peshmerga forces took control of Kirkuk, ISIS reached the outskirts of the sacred Shi‘i shrine city 
of Samarra. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the influential Shi‘i cleric, issued a fatwa for the defense of 
Baghdad and other sacred Shi‘i sites, but the popular defense against ISIS was insufficient. On 29 June 
2014, in Mosul, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS, declared the establishment of the Islamic 
Caliphate, with himself as Caliph, adopting the name “al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah,” or the Islamic 
State.382 
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My primary goal in piecing together this puzzle was to create a cohesive picture of the history 
of Sunni and Shi‘i Arab identities within the framework of the modern state of Iraq. This is based on 
the crucial understanding that communal identities are not rigid and unchanging phenomena, but 
rather, historical ones that change over time in accordance to social, political, and economic contexts, 
often related to the state. This thesis has traced four main periods of political history in Iraq. In each 
period, state- and (especially after 2003) non-state-led violence helped shape and harden the group 
identities of Sunni and Shi‘i Iraqis alike. 
During the period from the mid- to late-nineteenth century up to Saddam Hussein’s rise as 
president in 1979, there were many changes in the formal political makeup of the state. However, the 
level of group discrimination and/or violence remained fairly static throughout this period. At this 
point in time, political discrimination against Shi‘i Arabs was passively and actively punished by the 
Sunni Arab elite in Iraq against the Shi‘i Arabs of Iraq.383 This discrimination was primarily in the 
form of exclusion from governance and key decision-making positions, but it did not amount to 
sustained group violence against Shi‘is or express itself in violence between these two groups. The end 
of the Hashemite Dynasty came at the same time as the rise of a military-political machine, in which 
the power and control over the state often lay with the armed forces. This was the period in which 
coups were commonplace and grabs for power left Iraq in a period of confusion and politically-
motivated violence. The leaders, still, were primarily Sunni Arabs. 
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Under Saddam Hussein Iraq became a state ruled by a military and authoritarian dictatorship. 
However, Saddam Hussein’s state, including the top echelons of the Ba’th Party and the military, as 
well as the dictator’s group of Tikriti confidants, continued to be a Sunni-dominated affair. The wars 
with Iran and Kuwait served as catalysts for moments of state-led, large-scale and identity-based 
violence against civilians: first, during the Iran-Iraq War, the use of chemical weapons on civilian 
populations primarily in the north of Iraq in Kurdistan (including but not limited to the Anfal 
Campaign, a genocidal-like massacre of Iraqi Kurds), and second, the violent repression of Shi‘i Arabs 
during the 1991 uprisings that spread from Basrah to fourteen out of the country’s eighteen wilayat. 
This stage is therefore characterized by the first use of large-scale, state-led and identity-based violence 
against civilians.  
The collapse of the regime and the misguided nation-building project that followed led to a 
very different stage in group discrimination and violence in Iraq. The new government of American 
creation excluded virtually all Sunni Arabs from most political and civic positions of power, to a large 
extent as the result of the almost immediate decisions to disband the Ba’th Party and the military. The 
result of this was the rise of militias, both Sunni and Shi‘i, vying for power and control. This created a 
stage of violence characterized by the violence by non-state actors against civilians. Whereas in the 
previous stage the perpetrators of violence against civilians had consisted of a singular, state-led entity, 
the perpetrators of such violence during this stage were to a large extent militia formed by former 
civilians, now mobilized by a wide-range of Sunni and Shi‘i politico-religious leaders to attack civilians 
of the opposite identity group in a struggle to dominate the new state under Coalition auspices. This 
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kind of violence was perpetrated by al-Qa’ida (which soon became al-Qa’ida in Iraq, or AQI), 
Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, and other groups, such as the Badr Organization. 
One might visualize the difference as follows. During the era of Saddam, a person could step 
outside of his/her house and see the armed forces targeted his/her village, perhaps a known Kurdish 
peshmerga-stronghold or, later, a Shi‘i community. The perpetrator was the state and no other actor. 
In the post-Saddam era, someone could wear a rigged vest under the layers of their abaya and detonate 
it in the market. In this case, the perpetrator, probably an individual deployed by a militia or armed 
front trying to weaken the state in a bid for power, intended maximum impact on civilians and used 
this violence towards a political goal. These attacks were not the air campaigns and scorched earth 
tactics of Saddam, but rather suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which are 
much more difficult to detect and impossible to avoid. During this period, it can be argued that while 
the attacks were against civilians, they constituted a strategic move to weaken the state or the 
occupying power, being the U.S. During the “civil war,” which began in earnest in 2006, this shifted 
further. It was far less likely that the intent of an attack on civilians was to weaken the state. The street-
by-street fighting in sectarian neighborhoods in Baghdad was not focused on dominating the state but 
had evolved into civilian-on-civilian communal violence, with limited, local, and sometimes very 
intimate motivations and at other times, no rationale at all. This level of violence was no longer mainly 
about the state. 
In the months leading up to the 2009 provincial elections, Nuri al-Maliki’s rule as Prime 
Minister became increasingly autocratic. He increased de-Ba’thification efforts that targeted the 
underlying structures of the Party and sought to exclude Sunni Arabs from government positions and 
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the military. Maliki assembled a militia that took orders from him and him only and deployed them 
against Sunni civilians in the streets, killing thousands of protestors. In retaliation, many of the same 
groups that emerged during the Sunni insurgency reemerged angry and violent. In this time, AQI 
morphed into the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) and many of its fighters went to Syria during the outbreak 
of its civil war, where it recruited many other Sunni jihadists. These fighters crossed back into Iraq and 
unleashed a new period of non-state-led communal violence against Iraqis, though somewhat 
indiscriminately, considering they attacked both Sunnis and Shi‘is. The (then-called) Islamic State in 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) also developed into a powerful insurgent movement, seizing huge swaths of land 
and quickly creeping in on Baghdad. This chapter ends with the moment at which Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi, ISIS’s leader, speaking in a mosque in Mosul in 2014, declared the establishment of an 
Islamic Caliphate with himself as Caliph. ISIS fighters crossing the Syrian border in the march towards 
Mosul, in a moment hawked by the group into a spectacle, claimed the destruction of the “Sykes-Picot 
border.”384 
The years of identity-based violence has led to a “hardening” of these group identities, 
inextricably tying them to the communal memory of these periods of violence and/or discrimination. 
This thesis has analyzed the political contexts that shaped Shi‘i and Sunni group identities; 
documenting Iraqis’ personal experiences and self-views would require the writing of another thesis. 
However, it is worth ending on this note: in his novel, The Corpse Washer, Sinan Antoon brilliantly 
juxtaposes the cosmopolitan atmosphere and relative ease of everyday life, even under Saddam, and the 
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grim life after the U.S. invasion, when a seemingly never-ending stream of bodies piled into the 
protagonist, Jawad’s morgue that he inherited from his father to be washed. Although the book is 
fictional, the hardening of Sunni and Shi‘i identities lies at the very core of the book.385 Antoon 
remarks how, 
One of the few sources of joy for me during these short visits [to Iraq] were the encounters 
with Iraqis who had read my novels and were moved by them. These were novels I had written 
from afar, and through them, I tried to grapple with the painful disintegration of an entire 
country and the destruction of its social fabric.386 
 
Donald L. Donham, in his article “Staring at Suffering,” reflects on the hardening of group identities 
in the wake of violence perpetrated against civilians because of their group identities. He writes how 
the perceptions of the past are altered in the wake of violence against civilians: 
This tendency to read the present (after violence) into the past necessarily overemphasizes and 
overplays the role of hatred of the other as an explanation of violence. Nothing 
“primordializes” identity more efficiently than the personal experience of violence, especially 
violence that appears to be directed at one’s group as a group.387 
 
In other words, identity-based violence has the ability to create hardened political identities and 
destroy the communally-held memories of coexistence and tolerance. In tracing the history of Sunni 
and Shi‘i group identities, this thesis attempts to point to a future that draws inspiration from earlier 
times in breaking down these hardened identities. 
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